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Widening external imbalances have been a deﬁning feature of the global
landscape in recent years and, for many, constitute a key macroeconomic
risk for the world economy. But the debate is far from settled. Two issues
are central. First, is the present global pattern of current account imbal-
ances sustainable and for how long? Second, if these positions require un-
winding, can an orderly rebalancing be achieved without substantial dis-
ruption to global growth, international trade, and capital ﬂows, and under
what circumstances?
At the center of concern is the massive U.S. current account deﬁcit and
whether its resolution foreshadows a hard landing for the dollar. For ex-
ample, while the dollar has steadily depreciated (in real eﬀective terms)
since 2002, the U.S. deﬁcit and external surpluses elsewhere (e.g., Japan
and emerging Asia) have only widened further. How much farther will the
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Smooth Landing or Crash?
Model-Based Scenarios of Global
Current Account Rebalancing
Hamid Faruqee, Douglas Laxton, Dirk Muir, and 
Paolo A. Pesentidollar need to fall? The cautionary tale of past external adjustments fo-
cuses our attention on the wider ramiﬁcations of large, unsustainable cur-
rent account deﬁcits for exchange rates, domestic demand, and growth.1
Moreover, the prospect of large, disorderly swings in the value of the dol-
lar—given its dominant role in the international monetary system—pre-
sents an additional ﬁnancial risk with potentially far-reaching conse-
quences, and where the regions that may be most deeply aﬀected lie well
beyond U.S. shores.2
Leaving the possible fallout aside, how did we arrive at this point? A
decade ago, the current account deﬁcit of the United States stood around
100 billion dollars or 1.5 percent of annual output. Over the ensuing ten
years, that deﬁcit would balloon sixfold to over 600 billion dollars or 1.5
percent of world output, designating the world’s wealthiest nation as its
largest external borrower (by far). In terms of U.S. saving and investment,
the initial leg of burgeoning deﬁcits was led by brisk capital spending in the
mid- to late-1990s, which retreated after the equity bust began around the
turn of the century. At that same time, declining national saving—head-
lined by growing public deﬁcits and mounting debt—assumed a lead role
in the further expansion of the U.S. current account deﬁcit in the years that
followed up to the present day.
In historical perspective, the large U.S. external deﬁcit is unprecedented.
With reference to ﬁgure 10.1(where  is the sample average and  the stan-
dard deviation of the current account-to-gross domestic product [GDP]
ratio), over the past half-century, U.S. current accounts have centered
around a small deﬁcit over the postwar period (1.12 percent of GDP). But
the last decade has borne witness to a remarkable extension of the left tail
of this distribution. During the 1980s, an emergence of large U.S. external
deﬁcits—also against the backdrop of budgetary deﬁcits and dollar appre-
ciation—were reminiscent of the current episode. However, unlike the past
when the counterparts to U.S. deﬁcits were largely conﬁned to other G7 in-
dustrial countries, the current global constellation of external imbalances
has expanded the roster of players considerably.3
The current episode thus clearly suggests that matters are best viewed
from a wider, multilateral perspective, including in terms of the uneven
global pattern of growth and demand. A sanguine view of these develop-
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1. The literature on current account reversals and their nexus with growth and other vari-
ables is extensive; see, for example, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000), Edwards (2004), and
Freund (2000). See also Freund and Warnock (chap. 4 in this volume) and Adalet and Eichen-
green (chap. 6 in this volume).
2. Dollar dominance is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, though not a guaran-
tee; see Chinn and Frankel (chap. 8 in this volume).
3. China’s reserves increased by $117 billion in 2003, after subtracting $45 billion in re-
serves transferred in the recent bank recapitalization. These funds apparently remain in U.S.
dollar assets. South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore increased reserves by $34 billion, $44 bil-
lion, and $14 billion, respectively.ments (and their ultimate resolution) typically revolves around three re-
lated but distinct considerations: the Lawson doctrine, the new Bretton
Woods system, and globalization.
Under a generalized interpretation of the Lawson doctrine,4 external
imbalances are inconsequential as they merely reﬂect the market’s (opti-
mal) decisions regarding saving and investment.5 But two qualiﬁcations
should be noted. First, this presumes that the public sector’s balances re-
main in good standing. And second, private-sector decisions are not dis-
torted by any major market imperfections or failures. Prima facie, the
emergence of large budgetary deﬁcits in the United States (at least since
2000) and the role of emerging market economies in prevailing global im-
balances raise important caveats to the doctrine’s application in the cur-
rent circumstance. Nevertheless, the view that the current account deﬁcit
per se is not a problem, but remains the natural outgrowth of a strong do-
mestic economy relative to persistent weakness in major partners—mainly
Japan and Europe—has not receded.
Focusing on the important role of emerging markets in understanding
global imbalances, the new Bretton Woods hypothesis—advanced by
Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003)—posits that the constella-
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Fig. 10.1 Distribution of U.S. current accounts, 1960–2004 (percent of GDP)
4. In the late 1980s, Nigel Lawson, then British Chancellor of the exchequer, argued that the
large U.K. current account deﬁcit was a matter of no consequence, given that the public-
sector balance was in surplus. He also argued that this principle applied only to developed
countries, where it was more reasonable to assume that private agents behaved optimally.
5. See Corden (1994).tion of external imbalances partly reﬂects the deliberate actions (e.g., de
facto pegs) of periphery countries seeking export-led growth as a strategy
for economic development. In practical terms, this involves pegging the
currency to the U.S. dollar to help domestic exporters safeguard their U.S.
market shares and accumulate dollar reserves resulting from any payment
imbalances. So long as the periphery, with new entrants waiting in the
wings (e.g., India), willingly acquires dollar claims, this arrangement of
external imbalances can endure indeﬁnitely.6 For its part at the center, the
United States (a) resurrects its passive exchange rate role as the nth cur-
rency, and (b) provides liquidity and intermediation to the rest of the
world—beneﬁting by borrowing short (e.g., foreign sales of U.S. treasuries)
at favorable terms while lending long proﬁtably (i.e., U.S. foreign direct in-
vestment [FDI]).7
The third major aspect of the sanguine side of the debate is globaliza-
tion. A quarter century after Feldstein and Horioka (1980), saving and in-
vestment no longer appear quite so constrained to move in tandem, and the
universe of current account imbalances has clearly expanded.8 In other
words, the mere fact that external imbalances, in many cases, have grown
to unprecedented levels can be viewed as a testament to the better func-
tioning and increasing integration of global capital markets. Indeed, the
vast amounts of foreign saving mobilized to ﬁnance the ample shortfall of
U.S. saving relative to investment have broken new ground. With a new-
found ability to borrow (and lend), countries belonging to an increasingly
integrated global economy can further engage in intertemporal trade to
buﬀer against local shocks, smooth consumption, and raise welfare. A by-
product of globalization is that valuation eﬀects—operating on larger
gross levels of foreign assets or liabilities—can augment the traditional ex-
penditure-switching eﬀects of exchange rate adjustment and thereby facil-
itate a rebalancing scenario.9
So have we entered into a brave new world when thinking about global
imbalances? The mainstream view, as lucidly argued by Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ(2000a), would ﬁrmly reply not yet. Countervailing arguments note
that while the underlying trends toward a more integrated global economy
are undeniable, the limitations are also equally clear. Segmented goods
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6. Eichengreen (2004) criticizes this assessment, arguing that the periphery is not a cohe-
sive, uniform group, and could quickly unravel when national interests come into conﬂict with
collective ones. The possibility of two viable international currencies—that is, also the euro—
further complicates the picture.
7. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) elaborate on this maturity transformation
under the present global alignment. Adalet and Eichengreen (chap. 6 in this volume) criticize
this, too, arguing that being an international ﬁnancial center and providing intermediation
service does not necessitate a large (or any) deﬁcit on the part of the United States.
8. See Faruqee and Lee (2005) as well as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (chap. 2 in this volume).
9. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2003, 2004), Tille (2003), IMF (2005). An extreme
form of this argument where valuation eﬀects supplant the requisite adjustment in the trade
balance is exposited in Gourinchas and Rey (chap. 1 in this volume).markets and pricing to market, incomplete pass-through and disconnected
exchange rates, home bias in goods and in assets, and signiﬁcant trade
costs are all emblematic of an international economy still some ways oﬀ
from an idealized single, global market.10 These real-world features and
frictions raise cautionary ﬂags about a more complacent view of global im-
balances and the large shocks—including uneven economic and ﬁscal ex-
pansions—that have accompanied them. The key question from the main-
stream is not ifbut when (and how) the inevitable adjustment will occur. As
discussed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (chap. 9 in this volume), the concern is
that the exchange rate changes needed to generate enough expenditure
switching may be very large.11 The hope is that broader adjustment—di-
versiﬁed across countries and policy instruments—may be able to help
achieve a more orderly rebalancing and avoid a protectionist backlash.12
In sum, as implied by the stylized facts and by the various interpretations
of the present episode, the evolution (and resolution) of global imbalances
needs to be understood within a coherent multilateral framework. This pa-
per reexamines these multifaceted issues through the lens of a dynamic,
multiregion model of the global economy. The model oﬀers suﬃcient com-
plexity and richness to furnish a rigorous macroeconomic framework to
assess the economic implications, related risks, and policy recommenda-
tions associated with the prevailing constellation and the prospect of
global rebalancing of current accounts.
Informed by the multilateral analysis, our baseline view is that steady
global rebalancing with an orderly unwinding of ﬁnancial positions and
currency realignments—notably a gradual depreciation in the U.S. dol-
lar—can be achieved, although it is not assured. In this instance, the bur-
den of adjustment will largely fall on the United States and emerging Asia
in terms of reversing their past (net) national saving trends, requiring com-
mitted U.S. ﬁscal consolidation and aided by greater exchange rate ﬂexi-
bility in Asia that also limited output and inﬂation variability. Although
more uncertain, some normalization of private consumption rates (in op-
posing directions) in the two regions would further facilitate external ad-
justment.
Europe and Japan, for their part, could meaningfully contribute to the
multilateral adjustment process through stronger pursuit of growth-
enhancing structural reforms that align with their own national interests.
Led by competition friendly reforms in product markets and with structural
adjustment supported by monetary policy, credible measures tackling deep-
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10. See, for example, Engel (1993), Engel and Rogers (1996), Rogoﬀ (1996), Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (2000a,b), Devereux and Engel (2002), Corsetti and Dedola (2002), and Choudhri,
Faruqee, and Hakura (2005).
11. See also Engel (2002), Obstfeld (2002), and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a,b) for a mod-
ern view on expenditure switching eﬀects.
12. See De Rato (2005).seated structural impediments and distortions would boost their growth
and investment prospects, thereby contributing to external rebalancing.
Far less benign adjustment scenarios are also quite conceivable. A more
dangerous route, in the absence of underlying, broad-based adjustment in
macroeconomic and structural policies, would rely more on the vagaries of
global ﬁnancial markets. If mounting concerns over imbalances triggered
sizable international portfolio shifts, a sudden exit out of U.S. dollar assets
could eﬀect more dramatic changes to (interest and) exchange rates, in-
cluding a signiﬁcantly weaker U.S. dollar, with harmful knock-on eﬀects
for global growth.
A roadmap to the paper is as follows. Sections 10.2 and 10.3 outline the
structure and calibration of our multiregion model. Section 10.4 describes
the individual key elements needed to construct the central baseline sce-
nario of global rebalancing. Section 10.5 considers key alternative scenar-
ios and assesses the likely macroeconomic and policy implications. Section
10.6 concludes.
10.2 The Structure of the Model
The simulation model we construct in this paper is rather detailed and
complex. To simplify the exposition, in this section we limit ourselves to a
very synthetic and intuitive overview of the model, highlighting a few for-
mal features of particular relevance for the calibration exercise. Technical
details of the theoretical framework are extensively discussed in the ap-
pendix.
The overall structure of the model is illustrated in ﬁgure 10.2. The world
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Fig. 10.2 The structure of the modeleconomy consists of four regional blocs (countries): US (United States),13
JE (Japan and euro area), AS (emerging Asia), and RC (remaining coun-
tries).14 There is a common stochastic trend for the world economy (the
variable TREND), whose gross rate of growth between time t and time   is
denoted gt, . All quantity variables in the model are expressed in detrended
terms, that is, as ratios relative to TREND. In each country, there are
households, ﬁrms, and a government. Households consume a (nontrad-
able) ﬁnal good and supply diﬀerentiated labor inputs to ﬁrms. Firms pro-
duce ﬁnal goods, intermediate goods, and provide intermediation services.
The public sector consumes nontraded goods and services, ﬁnanced
through taxation or borrowing, and manages short-term interest rates
through monetary policy. Each sector is described in turn in the following.
Inﬁnitely lived households consume a nontradable ﬁnal good (C), and
each is the monopolistic supplier of a diﬀerentiated labor input ( ) to all
domestic ﬁrms.15There are two types of households: forward-looking ones
(with subscript FL) and liquidity-constrained ones (with subscript LC).
Liquidity-constrained agents represent a fraction sLC of national house-
holds. These households do not have access to capital markets and ﬁnance
their consumption exclusively through disposable labor incomes. The spec-
iﬁcation of households’ preferences adopts the Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Huﬀman (GHH; 1988) utility function, adjusted for habit formation
and preference shocks. Denoting W t( j) as lifetime expected utility of
household j, we have:
(1) W t( j)   Et∑
 
  t
 t, gt, 
1  u [C ( j),   (j)],
where the instantaneous felicity is proportional to:
(2) ut[Ct( j),  t(j)] 
       
1   
1  
In the preceding expressions,  t,  is the discount rate, possibly diﬀerent
across countries, between time tand time  . The term gt, 
1– in (1) implies that
the disutility of labor eﬀort moves with the common trend. As is custom-
ary, this feature can be interpreted as technological progress associated
with home production activities, here related to the global trend. The pa-
 t( j)   b  j,t 1   
1   b 
ZV  
1   
Ct(j)   bcCj,t 1/gt 1,t    
1   bc/gt 1,t
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13. To avoid confusion, in the text we refer to “US” as the region of the model and to the
“U.S.” as the real-world United States.
14. The choice of regional aggregation is discussed in section 10.3.1.
15. Interpreting TRENDtas labor-augmenting technical change at time t,  tin the model is
time devoted to work, assumed to be bounded by endowment, while eﬀective labor is
TRENDt t. It follows that the nominal wage (the monetary remuneration for one unit of la-
bor services  t) can be trending both because of nominal inﬂation and because of real (labor-
augmenting) growth.rameter   in equations (1) and (2) is the reciprocal of the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution. The parameter   that aﬀects the curvature of la-
bor disutility is the reciprocal of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. There
is habit persistence in consumption with coeﬃcient 0   bc   1. The term
Cj,t–1 is past per-capita consumption of household j’s peers (i.e., either for-
ward-looking or liquidity-constrained agents). Similarly, there is habit per-
sistence in leisure with coeﬃcient 0   bt   1. The term ZV is a constant.
Forward-looking households own domestic ﬁrms and the domestic cap-
ital stock (K), which they rent to domestic ﬁrms. The market for capital is
competitive. Capital accumulation is subject to adjustment costs, as are
wage contracts (i.e., nominal wage rigidities). Labor and capital are im-
mobile internationally. Forward-looking households in each country also
own two short-term nominal bonds, one denominated in domestic cur-
rency and issued by that country’s government, and another denominated
in US currency and issued in zero net supply worldwide. There are inter-
mediation costs for national households transacting in the international
bond market. No other asset is traded internationally.
On the production side, perfectly competitive ﬁrms produce two ﬁnal
goods—a consumption good (A) and an investment good (E). The con-
sumption good is consumed either by domestic households or by the gov-
ernment (GC). Similarly, demand for the investment good is split between
private agents (I) and the public sector (GI). Final goods are produced by
using all available intermediate goods as inputs. Intermediate goods are ei-
ther nontraded (N) or traded internationally (T). Domestic tradables used
by domestic ﬁrms are denoted Q, imports are denoted M. For instance, a
ﬁrm x produces the consumption good with the following nested constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) technology:
(3) At(x)1 (1/eA)   (1    A,t)1/e AN A,t(x)1 (1/eA)    A,t
1/eA[ A
1/ AQA,t(x)1 (1/ A)
  (1    A)1/ AM A,t(x)1 (1/ A)]{[ A/( A 1)][(1 1/eA)]}
The three intermediate inputs used in the production of the consumption
good Aare a basket N Aof nontradable goods, a basket QAof domestic trad-
able goods, and a basket M A of imported goods. The elasticity of substitu-
tion between tradables and nontradables is e A> 0, and the elasticity of sub-
stitution between domestic and imported tradables is  A   0. The weights
of the three inputs in production are, respectively, 1 –  A,  A  Aand  A(1 –   A).
To handle the diﬀerent goods produced in diﬀerent countries, the vari-
able M Adenotes a combination of diﬀerent baskets of goods imported from
the rest of the world. To model realistic dynamics of import volumes—such
as delayed and sluggish adjustment to changes in relative prices—we as-
sume that imports are subject to short-term adjustment costs (discussed in
detail in the appendix). More precisely, referring to a generic country as
CO, and to the importing country as H, ﬁrm xH’s imports MA
H(xH) are a
CES function of baskets of goods imported from the other countries, or







H,CO(xH) [1    MA,t
H,CO(xH)]}1 (1/ A
H).
In the preceding expression,  A
H is the elasticity of import substitution
across countries; a higher value for  A
H implies that it is easier for ﬁrm xH to
substitute imports from one country with imports from another. The
weights bA
H,CO (summing up to one) determine the composition of the im-
port basket across countries. MA
H,CO(xH) denotes imports from country CO
by ﬁrm xH located in country H, and  MA
H,CO(xH) denotes the associated ad-
justment costs.
Intermediate goods are available in diﬀerent varieties, each produced by
a single ﬁrm under conditions of monopolistic competition worldwide.
The prices of intermediate goods are subject to adjustment costs (nominal
price rigidities). These goods are produced with domestic labor inputs and
domestic capital. For instance, the nontradable variety n is produced with
the following CES technology:
(5) Nt(n)   ZN,t[(1    N)1/ N t(n)1 (1/ N)    N
1/ NKt(n)1 (1/ N)] N/( N 1)
Firm n uses labor  (n) and capital K(n) to produce N(n) units of its variety.
 N   0 is the elasticity of input substitution, and ZN is a sectoral produc-
tivity shock common to all producers of nontradables.16
Finally, the government purchases the two national ﬁnal goods as well as
nontradable services GN. As treasury, the government ﬁnances the excess
of its expenditures over net taxes by borrowing from the domestic private
sector. As central bank, the government manages the national short-term
nominal interest rate. Monetary policy is speciﬁed in terms of a credible




In what follows, we suggest a plausible calibration of the many parame-
ters introduced in the model and discuss in some detail the reasons under-
lying our choices. In general, we rely on previous work done with the In-
ternational Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Global Economy Model (GEM) as
well as estimates from the literature and our own empirical work.
Given the importance of a multicountry setting, some thought has been
given to the composition of the regional blocs. As mentioned in section
10.2, to conserve on complexity we choose a four-region model—US (the
United States), JE (Japan and the euro area countries), AS (emerging Asia:
Smooth Landing or Crash? Model-Based Scenarios 385
16. Recall that a productivity shock is deﬁned as a deviation from the common world trend.
Variants of the model allow for the possibility of shocks to labor productivity or capital pro-
ductivity instead of total factor productivity.China, India, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan province of China, and Thailand) and RC (the remaining
countries not considered elsewhere).
The decision to combine Japan and the euro area into one region re-
ﬂects, from the vantage point of our project, their overlap in key structural
characteristics—low productivity growth, very low inﬂation (or deﬂation),
and structural rigidities, particularly in the labor market. Needless to say,
Japan and the euro area have exhibited very diﬀerent behaviors in the past
regarding the accumulation of U.S. assets, foreign exchange intervention
policy, and so on. However, our prior is that their role in the global rebal-
ancing process will become comparatively less relevant in the years ahead
and compared to Emerging Asia.
This latter bloc groups Asian countries with strong growth and whose
currencies exhibit limited ﬂexibility against the U.S. dollar. Moreover, their
labor markets tend to be rapidly growing and fairly ﬂexible. In addition,
the ongoing process of market liberalization is expected to reduce entry
barriers and enhance competition, including in the major constituents
such as India and China. The RC bloc is dominated by the other members
of the European Union (particularly the United Kingdom) and the other
major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Mexico.
Keeping the composition of the four regions in mind, in what follows we
discuss the calibration of the domestic economies. We then focus on the in-
ternational elements of the model and pursue a realistic description of the
macroeconomic interdependencies between regions, particularly their
trade linkages and ﬁscal spillovers.
10.3.2 Parameterization of the Regional Blocs
Tables 10.1 through 10.5 document the parameterization adopted for
the four regional blocs. Unless otherwise stated, similar behavioral pa-
rameter values apply to all regions.
Table 10.1 presents the parameters that are key for the consumers’ opti-
mization problem. Although consumers may diﬀer with respect to their ac-
cess to ﬁnancing, the preferences of the liquidity-constrained and forward-
looking households are taken to be the same. We assume that in US, JE,
and RC the share of liquidity-constrained consumers (sLC) is 25 percent.
The share is much higher in emerging Asia at 50 percent, reﬂecting the nas-
cent or underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets for domestic consumers—par-
ticularly, in the cases of China, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
The rate of time preference (the annualized inverse of   in equation [1])
in combination with trend growth (g in equation [1]) of 2 percent per year
is consistent with an annualized quarterly real world interest rate of 3 per-
cent. The US, the most impatient region, has the highest rate of time pref-
erence at 3.2 percent; AS, the most patient, has a rate of 2.6 percent. For
386 Hamid Faruqee, Douglas Laxton, Dirk Muir, and Paolo A. Pesentiall regions, we assume a high degree of intertemporal substitution in con-
sumption (1/ ) of 5. This combined with a high value for habit persistence
(bc   0.91) generates sluggish consumption behavior in the short run and
hump-shaped dynamics in response to changes in the real interest rate.
Conversely for labor, we assume a low Frisch elasticity (1/ ) in the long run
of 0.40, coupled with lower habit persistence (b ) of 0.75. These choices are
similar to the assumptions found in Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti (2004),
adjusted for our use of the GHH utility function.
For the ﬁrms’ optimization problem, we also refer the reader to table
10.1. The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital ( N and  T in
5) is set at 0.75 in both the tradable and nontradable sectors. This is slightly
lower than the conventional (Cobb-Douglas) unitary assumption in order
to help reduce the sensitivity of capital to changes in its relative price. The
bias toward the use of capital ( T and  N) is calibrated to achieve a rela-
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Table 10.1 Baseline parameterization of the regional blocs
Parameter US AS JE RC
Rate of time preference (1/ 4 – 1)   100 3.2 2.6 2.7 2.7
Depreciation rate   0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/  5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Habit persistence in consumption bc 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor   2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50
Habit persistence in labor b  0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Tradable intermediate goods
Substitution between factors of production  T 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Bias towards capital  T 0.67 0.72 0.76 0.67
Nontradable intermediate goods
Substitution between factors of production  N 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Bias toward capital  N 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.62
Final consumption goods
Substitution between domestic and imported 
goods  A 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Bias towards domestic goods  A 0.96 0.07 0.39 0.15
Substitution between domestic tradables and 
nontradables εA 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Bias towards tradable goods  A 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.32
Final investment goods
Substitution between domestic and imported 
goods  E 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Bias towards domestic goods  E 0.98 0.05 0.78 0.17
Substitution between domestic tradables and 
nontradables εE 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Bias towards tradable goods  E 0.77 0.82 0.80 0.76
Notes: US   United States; AS   Emerging Asia; JE   Japan/Euro area; RC   remaining
countries.tively high investment share of GDP in AS, and a low share in US, in line
with their respective historical averages (see table 10.2). In all regions, the
nontradable sector (e.g., services) is assumed to be less capital intensive
than the tradable sector (e.g., manufacturing). The depreciation rate is as-
sumed to be 2 percent per quarter across all regions (8 percent per year).
The dynamics of the model are governed by the nominal rigidities and
real adjustment costs described in table 10.3. The standard parameter
choice of 400 for quadratic adjustment costs in prices is roughly equivalent
to a four-quarter contract length under Calvo-style pricing. Real rigidities
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Table 10.2 Steady-state national accounts decomposition in the baseline scenario
Ratio of GDP US AS JE RC
Total consumption 79.6 69.7 76.8 77.5
Private C 67.1 58.7 56.5 63.5
Liquidity-constrained consumers CLC 5.1 9.9 3.0 4.4
Forward-looking consumers CFL 62.1 48.8 53.5 59.1
Public GC   P NGN 12.5 11.0 20.5 14.3
Total investment P EE 19.7 29.6 23.3 22.9
Private P EI 17.2 27.6 20.2 20.4
Public P EGI 2.5 2.0 3.0 2.5
Trade balance TBAL 0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.3
Imports IM 12.1 26.2 15.8 24.3
Consumption goods P MAMA 7.9 12.7 13.1 13.1
Investment goods P MEME 4.2 13.5 2.7 11.2
Government debt B 61.5 24.0 67.0 30.0
Net foreign assets B∗ –54.2 31.3 17.4 23.5
Share of world GDP (%) 27.9 15.5 32.2 24.4
Note: See table 10.1 notes.
Table 10.3 Real adjustment costs and nominal rigidities
Parameter US AS JE RC
Real adjustment costs
Capital accumulation  I1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Investment changes  I2 78 78 78 78
Imports of consumption goods  MA 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Imports of investment goods  ME 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Nominal rigidities
Wages for liquidity-constrained consumers  WLC 400 400 400 400
Wages for forward-looking consumers  WFL 400 400 400 400
Price of domestically-produced tradables  PQ 400 400 400 400
Price of nontradables  PN 400 400 400 400
Price of imported intermediate goods  PM 400 400 400 400
Note: See table 10.1 notes.in investment align with the parameterization in Juillard et al. (2005) for 
a Bayesian-estimated, closed economy dynamic stochastic general-
equilibrium (DSGE) model of the United States. For real rigidities in im-
ports, a value of 0.95 approximates the typical sluggish reaction by vol-
umes to movements in the real exchange rate.
There are separate markups on tradable and nontradable goods (table
10.4) as ﬁrms have some pricing power under monopolistic competition.
We use estimates for the price markups from Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat
(1996) in the case of US, JE, and RC. The US bloc has the lowest price
markups, indicating the greatest degree of competition, while Japan and
the euro area have the highest. For AS, the markups are indicative of some
(very) preliminary estimates done in the research department of the IMF
for certain member countries of the AS bloc.
Similarly, in the labor market agents have some pricing power, resulting
in the wage markups of table 10.4. For US and JE the markups (16 percent
and 30 percent, respectively) correspond to Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti
(2004).17 We further assume that RC is somewhere in between US and JE,
with a 20 percent wage markup, while we assume AS has a labor market as
competitive as US.
Finally, to provide a nominal anchor for the domestic economy, mone-
tary policy is parameterized as follows (table 10.5). The US, JE, and RC are
all committed to price stability, and we assume they follow an inﬂation-
forecast-based (IFB) rule.18 A representative calibration of IFB rules is
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Table 10.4 Price and wage markups
Parameter US AS JE RC
Tradables
Markup  T /( T – 1) 1.15 1.14 1.21 1.17
 T 7.67 8.00 5.70 6.73
Nontradables
Markup  N/( N – 1) 1.28 1.27 1.40 1.33
 N 4.58 4.75 3.50 4.04
Wages
Markup  /(  – 1) 1.16 1.16 1.30 1.20
  7.30 7.30 4.30 6.00
Note: See table 10.1 notes.
17. Their determination of the wage markups is based, in turn, on Jean and Nicoletti (2002),
who consider the wage diﬀerentials for a variety of industries in the United States and six
member states of the euro area.
18. Inﬂation-forecast-based rules have been used extensively in central bank models with
inﬂation-targeting regimes in both advanced and emerging-market economies—see, for ex-
ample, Laxton, Rose, and Tetlow (1993), Batini and Haldane (1999), Hunt, Rose, and Scott
(2000), and Coats, Laxton, and Rose (2003). They have also been used in empirical work to
characterize monetary policy in other countries that do not have explicit inﬂation-targetingused, with a weight of 0.75 on the lagged short-term interest in order to im-
part a high degree of smoothing in the setting of policy rates, and a weight
of 2.00 on the three-quarter ahead gap between inﬂation and its target. The
year-on-year CPI inﬂation target is assumed to be ﬁxed at 2 percent for JE
and RC, and somewhat higher at 2.5 percent for US. Emerging Asia is as-
sumed to pursue a ﬁxed exchange rate regime against the U.S. dollar.19 In
the following alternative scenario, AS switches to an inﬂation-based rule
but starts with a high value for its implicit inﬂation objective and adopts a
lower 2.5 percent target two years after the regime switch.
10.3.3 The International Dimensions
The main results of the model rely heavily upon the calibration of each
region’s external sector in table 10.6. For given steady-state net foreign as-
set positions for each region, it is straightforward to calculate the current
account and trade balances consistent with long-term stock-ﬂow equilib-
rium. Using the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics on merchandise trade,
the national accounts data on the imports of goods and services, and the
United Nations’ Commodity Trade Statistics (COMTRADE) data on
each region’s imports of consumer and capital goods, we derive a disaggre-
gated steady-state matrix delineating the pattern and composition of trade
for all regions’ exports and imports. A more aggregated form is found in
ﬁgure 10.3. On the basis of this trade matrix, we derive all the weight co-
eﬃcients in the demand function for imports (  Aand  Ein equation [3]) and
the regional composition of imports (b A and bE in equation [4]).
For the corresponding trade elasticities, we assume that the elasticity of
substitution between domestically produced and imported tradable con-
sumption goods ( A in equation [3]) and investment goods ( E) is 2.5 as in
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Table 10.5 Monetary Policy
Parameter IFB rule Fixed exchange rate regime
Lagged interest rate at t –1 i 0.75 1.00
Inﬂation gap at t   3 1 2.00 0.00
Change in the nominal exchange rate at t 2 0.00 1,000,000 (proxy for  )
regimes, but have ﬂexible exchange rates—see Orphanides (2003) and Juillard and others
(2004). It is important to note that IFB rules are ad hoc. Svensson (1999) and Svensson and
Woodford (2005) have proposed inﬂation-forecast-targeting (IFT) rules based on optimizing
loss functions, and it is only a question of time before IFT rules are used extensively on lin-
earized versions of models whose type and size are similar to ours.
19. This should be interpreted as a sensible approximation rather than in literal terms, given
that China is the largest member of AS, and the limited ﬂexibility of its currency against the
U.S. dollar is at the center of the current policy debate. Similarly, other members such as Hong
Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia attempt
to manage the volatility of their currencies vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.Fig. 10.3 International trade linkages (steady-state calibration; percent of
world GDP)
Table 10.6 Calibrating the international linkages
Parameter US AS JE RC
Substitution between imports from diﬀerent regions  A 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Bias towards imported consumption goods b A from:
United States 0.33 0.22 0.52
Emerging Asia 0.15 0.16 0.06
Japan/Euro area 0.32 0.42 0.42
Remaining countries 0.53 0.25 0.62
Substitution between imports from diﬀerent regions  E 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Bias towards imported investment goods b E from:
United States 0.45 0.78 0.51
Emerging Asia 0.25 0.17 0.11
Japan/Euro area 0.30 0.27 0.38
Remaining countries 0.45 0.28 0.05
Net foreign liabilities
Short-run dynamics   B1 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Short-run dynamics   B2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
% related to domestic government debt  F1 0.50 0.050 0.50 0.50
% related to U.S. government debt  F2 0.24 0.38 0.38Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti (2004). The elasticity of substitution be-
tween goods from diﬀerent regions for imported consumption goods (  A in
equation [4]) and imported investment goods ( E) is set at 1.5, consistent
with existing estimates of import elasticities.
Last, we need to calibrate the behavior of net foreign assets, also in table
10.6.20 For the long-run behavior of net foreign assets, our prior is that a
permanent increase in government debt by 1 percentage point of GDP is
roughly associated with an increase in the net foreign liability position of
the region by 0.5 percentage points of GDP.21 As we discuss in the follow-
ing, overlapping generations models (particularly those that follow the
Blanchard-Weil-Yaari formulation) provide theoretical underpinnings to
evaluate this non-Ricardian behavior. Quantitative simulations using
models with such characteristics—speciﬁcally, the IMF’s Global Fiscal
Model (GFM) described in Botman et al. (2006) and Multimod (Faruqee
et al. 1998)—are consistent with a value between roughly 0.40 and 0.80.
Moreover, when the US expands its net foreign liabilities as a result of a
permanent change in its public debt, the absorption of new issuance by
each region is calibrated (on the basis of net foreign asset holdings in re-
cent years) by assigning 24 percent of new issuance by US to AS, and 38
percent to each of JE and RC. This calibration implies that for a 1 percent
net foreign liability (NFL)-to-GDP shock in US, the AS net foreign asset-
to-GDP rises the most—around 0.8 percent of GDP—while JE and RC see
their ratios only rise by around 0.3 and 0.5 percent of GDP, respectively.
10.4 A Baseline Scenario
10.4.1 The Six Component Shocks
We now construct a baseline scenario for the global rebalancing of cur-
rent accounts. This is of interest not only per se—as a model-based quan-
titative assessment of macroeconomic adjustment paths in the global econ-
omy—but also as a benchmark, against which one can analyze and discuss
alternative scenarios. The baseline is an attempt to identify the sources of
the current global disequilibrium, accounting for both the shocks emanat-
ing from the United States and the respective role played by other regions.
The purpose of the baseline is to coherently guide our thinking on the
central questions surrounding external developments: What are the key
macroeconomic factors underlying the recent dynamics of current account
imbalances and real exchange rates in the world economy? What assump-
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20. With reference to the notation of the appendix, the short-run speed of adjustment is
governed by  V1 and  B2, set at 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. This is consistent with most previ-
ous work based on GEM—see Laxton and Pesenti (2003), Hunt and Rebucci (2005), and Bay-
oumi, Laxton, and Pesenti (2004).
21. In terms of the notation adopted in the appendix, this implies that  F1 is equal to 1/2.tions about the size and persistence of the key underlying shocks are
needed to ﬁt the facts? What is the range of possible future trajectories for
the relevant macroeconomic variables?
We are less interested in explaining and rationalizing current account
dynamics over the past decade than in providing elements for an analysis
of the present global outlook. Correspondingly, the baseline scenario is
formulated on the general premise that the prevailing imbalances have
mainly reﬂected savings behavior as of late, by both private and public
agents, rather than the investment dynamics fueled by the market exuber-
ance observed in the second half of the 1990s.22
Speciﬁcally, our working hypotheses are that the central tendencies
underlying the global macroeconomic imbalances in the early 2000s can be
attributed to a combination of six related but distinct shocks. The ﬁrst
three shocks center around the U.S. economy:
1. Higher U.S. government debt (with initial tax cuts followed by future
tax hikes) centered around the announced plans of the U.S. federal gov-
ernment
2. A permanent decline in the private savings rate in the United States
3. An increase in the demand for U.S. assets abroad, particularly in
emerging Asia
The next two shocks reﬂect relative productivity trends in the rest of the
world. In the model, worldwide convergence of productivity growth rates
is taken as the anchoring feature of the economy in the long term. How-
ever, prolonged deviations from balanced growth can play a key role in the
unfolding of medium-term rebalancing scenarios, in line with the asym-
metric tendencies observed across regions in the past decade. The follow-
ing are the shocks:
4. Very persistent and rapid productivity growth in emerging Asia with
a central tendency starting at 5.5 percent per year
5. Very persistent and lagging productivity growth in Japan and the
euro area with a central tendency of 0.75 percent per year
The ﬁnal shock attempts to capture policy choices in emerging Asia, in-
cluding strategies of export promotion in China. The speciﬁc way these
competitiveness-friendly strategies are introduced is through the following:
6. A short-run and temporary positive shock to AS ﬁscal policy to sub-
sidize exports in order to increase rest of the world demand for AS exports
by 5 percentage points of their imports
We now consider each of these shocks in turn, by outlining their central
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22. See Hunt and Rebucci (2005) for a model-based analysis of current account imbalances
over the 1990s.tendencies and discussing their eﬀects on the regional economies. The dy-
namics are reported for the ﬁrst 80 quarters (i.e., a twenty-year horizon) af-
ter each shock begins.23 Afterward, we will discuss the baseline scenario,
which is simply an integrated presentation of these shocks.
It should be understood, however, that the behavior of the national
economies in the baseline scenario is not a simple add-up of the six shocks.
Each shock in fact can enhance, amplify, or dampen the outcomes of the
other shocks. For example, a very persistent productivity shock in emerg-
ing Asia results in AS increasing its share in the world economy from 9.4
percent to 12.2 percent in the long run. In the case of the public debt shock
in the United States, there is a considerable reaction of the Asian current
account to the increased availability in the portfolio of US assets. The
change in the current account-to-GDP ratio is smaller in the baseline sce-
nario for the US public debt shock than in the presentation of the US
public debt shock in isolation. This is simply because AS is much larger in
the baseline (over 12.2 percent of the world instead of 9.4 percent) due to
the productivity shock and has to devote fewer resources (as a share of
GDP) in order to absorb its share of new US government debt. To put it
simply, the sum is greater (or, in this case, lesser) than its parts. Where ap-
propriate, in the remainder of this section we will try to highlight the most
important cross-eﬀects that occur in the baseline scenario.
Public Debt in the United States
For the public savings shock in the US, we couple a sustained increase in
the government deﬁcit for the next ﬁve years with a steady-state government
debt shock of 11.5 percent of GDP (ﬁgures 10.4 and 10.5).24 The steady-
state government deﬁcit of the US rises from 2.2 to 2.7 percent.25 We ob-
serve lower taxes today, but higher taxes in the future to meet the interest
payment obligations on the debt. The increased borrowing by the ﬁscal au-
thority crowds out the trade balance, thereby worsening the current ac-
count deﬁcit relative to the initial steady state. We also observe a real ex-
change rate appreciation in the short run, but a depreciation in the long run.
In the long run the increase in government debt increases US net foreign
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23. It is worth emphasizing that in several cases the variables reported in the charts keep in-
creasing (or falling) after the twenty-year horizon to approach their steady-state levels.
24. We implement the government debt shock as follows. We increase the steady-state govern-
ment debt-to-GDP ratio in the United States by 11.5 percentage points. We implement the shock
in the short run by letting the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio for the US peak at 5 percent after two years
and then decline to the steady-state value of 2.7 percent of GDP. This demonstrates the eﬀect of
the US government deﬁcit shock alone. In a framework with an endogenous link between gov-
ernment debt, NFAs, and the world real interest rate (as found in overlapping generations mod-
els of the Blanchard-Weil-Yaari type such as the aforementioned GFM) there would also be a
permanent increase in the US interest rate to account for the crowding out eﬀects on investment.
25. Figures 10.4 through 10.15 report variables as deviations from the initial steady state.
For instance, for the US government deﬁcit in ﬁgure 10.4, the starting point corresponds to a
deﬁcit of 2.2 percent and the endpoint to a deﬁcit 0.5 percentage points above the initial level.liabilities by 5.75 percent of GDP, which is ﬁnanced by the rest of the
world. Relative to each region’s GDP, AS sees the largest eﬀect, as its net
foreign asset (NFA) position increases by 4.40 percent of GDP in the long
run, which means it must be ﬁnanced by an increase in the current account
surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP in the medium term and 0.2 percent of GDP
in the long run. There are similar eﬀects in JE and RC, but they are smaller.
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Fig. 10.4 United States—Government debt shock in the United StatesFig. 10.5 Rest of the world—Government debt shock in the United StatesPrivate Savings in the United States
The reduction in US consumers’ desire to save is represented by an in-
crease in the rate of time preference in the US relative to the rest of the world
of 50 basis points, as well as a risk premium shock of 30 basis points for
twenty-ﬁve years (ﬁgures 10.6 and 10.7).26 At the same time, we assume AS
is more patient than JE or RC—they have a lower rate of time preference at
2.6 percent. So a negative private savings shock in the US eventually results
in an increase in the real interest rate, and a reduction in domestic demand.
In the short run, there is a deterioration of the current account balance
of 0.5 percent of GDP in US. However, there is a long-run depreciation,
which means there is an improvement in the steady-state trade balance.
The spillover eﬀects are relatively minor, their magnitudes depending en-
tirely upon the extent of US trade linkages with AS, JE, and RC.
Foreign Demand for U.S. Assets
The third major component of the baseline scenario is an increase in the
demand for US assets in the rest of the world (ﬁgures 10.8 and 10.9).27 The
major foreign investor in US dollar assets in this shock is AS (and, to a
lesser extent, JE as Japan behaves much like the rest of Asia in its demand
for US assets). We see that AS saves more and increases its net foreign as-
set holdings by 20.5 percentage points of GDP permanently, with lesser in-
creases in JE and RC (5.2 and 9.0 percentage points of GDP, respectively).
This results in an increase in the US NFL-to-GDP ratio by 20 percentage
points.
As a counterpart to its asset accumulation, AS runs a current account
surplus that shows up as a US current account deﬁcit of 3.7 percent in the
short run and 1 percent in the long run. In the short run, households in US
consume more but in AS consume less. The converse is true in the long run.
Output growth in AS is also positive, once the sharp negative eﬀects of the
sudden real appreciation wears oﬀ. The short-run appreciation of the AS
real eﬀective exchange rate is the result of adjusted uncovered interest par-
ity as higher real interest rate diﬀerentials are necessary in the future to
maintain its nominal exchange rate peg vis-à-vis the US.
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26. The private savings shock has both a temporary and permanent component. The per-
manent component is the rate of time preference shock. Relative to the initial world rate of
time preference (1/ 4 – 1) of 2.7 percent, AS is more patient at 2.6 percent (a negative 10 ba-
sis point shock), while US is much more impatient at 3.2 percent (a positive 50 basis point
shock). For the temporary component, we increase the risk premium ZB (see eq. [A42] in the
appendix) for all regional blocs by 1 percent for twenty-ﬁve years.
27. For the technical implementation, we rely on the autonomous holdings (b
∗
FNEUT) in the
desired net foreign asset position equation (equation [A43] in the appendix). In order to ﬁ-
nance the increase in US net foreign liabilities by 20 percentage points of GDP, AS increases
its steady-state holdings of NFAs by 20.5 percentage points of GDP; JE increases its steady-
state holdings of NFAs by 5.2 percentage points of GDP; and RC increases its steady-state
holdings of NFAs by 9 percentage points of GDP.Fig. 10.6 United States—Private savings shock in the United StatesFig. 10.7 Rest of the world—Private savings shock in the United StatesFig. 10.8 United States—Preference for US assets shock in the rest of the worldFig. 10.9 Rest of the world—Preference for US assets shock in the rest of
the worldProductivity Growth in JE (Japan and the Euro Area)
Japan and the euro area face a persistent negative shock of 0.75 per-
centage points to its productivity growth rate that lasts for thirteen years
(ﬁgures 10.10 and 10.11).28 Relative to the initial steady state, we see a no-
table decrease in output. Paired with a decrease in the marginal product of
capital, there is a sustained decrease in investment to achieve a new lower
capital-output ratio. Because the productivity shock is generalized across
the entire economy, we see a long-term real appreciation. The spillover
eﬀects in the rest of the world are mostly conﬁned to RC and AS (which
have strong links to Japan), but less in US, reﬂecting their trading patterns
with the rest of the world.
In the baseline scenario, this productivity shock serves to reduce the eco-
nomic size of JE relative to the other regions, reducing the international
eﬀects of other shocks. One exception is that the current account balance
eﬀects of the US public debt shock is higher as a share of GDP as JE still
has the same portion of US debt to ﬁnance through accumulation of NFA
as in the isolated presentation of the US public debt shock.
Productivity Growth in AS (Emerging Asia)
This shock basically has the same eﬀects as the shock in JE, but with all
the signs of the responses reverted (ﬁgures 10.12 and 10.13). The AS has,
on average, a higher growth rate of productivity, starting around 5.5 per-
cent per year before returning close to the world trend growth rate of 2 per-
cent after roughly thirty years.29 Relative to the initial steady state, we see
a large increase in output. Because of the increase in the marginal product
of capital, there is also a sustained increase in investment to achieve a new
higher capital-output ratio. Because the productivity shock is generalized
across the entire economy, we see a long-term real depreciation of around
4.5 percent.
In the ﬁrst two years there is a small increase in inﬂation by about 0.2
percent, followed by a sustained 0.8 percent disinﬂation as the expansion
of productive capacity continues. The disinﬂation continues almost until
twelve years after the shock begins. Given the higher degree of ﬂexibility in
price setting for the labor and goods markets in AS and the fact that mon-
etary policy is conducted to defend an exchange rate peg rather than pur-
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28. To be more precise, we assume that productivity grows at 1.25 percent per year for thir-
teen years in JE for both the tradable and nontradable sectors, instead of at the world trend
growth rate of 2 percent.
29. Technically, the productivity growth rate shocks diﬀer between the tradable and non-
tradable sectors. For the nontradable sector, productivity grows in AS at 3 percent per year
for eight years. The shock in the tradable sector is much larger and much longer. Overall, the
productivity growth rate in AS is close to 5.5 percent a year at the beginning of the shock, de-
clining steadily to around 2.25 percent after thirty years and returning to the trend 2 percent
growth rate two years later.Fig. 10.10 Japan and the euro area—Negative productivity shock in Japan and the
euro areaFig. 10.11 Rest of the world—Negative productivity shock in Japan and the
euro areaFig. 10.12 Emerging Asia—Positive productivity shock in emerging AsiaFig. 10.13 Rest of the world—Positive productivity shock in emerging Asiasue an inﬂation target, the dynamics of the shock are less extreme than
would occur in a regional bloc such as JE.
The spillover eﬀects from the shock in AS are not much larger than those
spillovers from the JE productivity shock, despite its much more sustained
and larger extent. This results from the fact that AS is merely 9.4 percent
of world GDP in the initial equilibrium (whereas JE is 34.6 percent) and
the fact that AS has stronger linkages with US than JE does (relatively
speaking). Therefore, the productivity shock in AS also contributes to our
formulation of the baseline scenario in US, where we see a current account
deﬁcit opening up in the medium to long term.
Fiscal Policy in AS
The role of AS in the baseline scenario is enhanced by a positive ﬁscal
policy shock in AS that is used to ﬁnance exports to the rest of the world
(ﬁgures 10.14 and 10.15).30 By running a higher deﬁcit than the initial
steady state conditions imply, the government is able to subsidize the ex-
port of its goods and services abroad. In turn, this short-run subsidization
is associated with a permanent shift in the rest of the world’s preferences
for AS goods.31
In the long run, demand for AS’s goods is permanently higher by ﬁve
percent of imports in the three other regional blocs (JE, US, and RC).
However, because the increase in the government deﬁcit is only temporary,
there is no long-run shift in the level of net foreign liabilities in AS. There-
fore, the long-run trade balance is unchanged in AS and the higher demand
of AS goods abroad is oﬀset by a permanent real appreciation of the ex-
change rate of 23 percent, leading to a higher level of AS imports from
abroad.
This has implications for the other regions of the world. In the medium
term, the increase in exports in the rest of the world roughly oﬀsets the in-
crease in demand for imports from AS, meaning the US sees almost no
change in its current account position, while JE and RC see slight improve-
ments. There are some signiﬁcant short-run increases in the current account-
to-GDP ratios in JE (0.3 percent of GDP) and RC (0.7 percent of GDP). The
main eﬀect of this shock is a long-run realignment of real eﬀective exchange
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30. Export subsidies are not modeled as direct subsidies because they usually take the form
of tax rebates, accelerated depreciation allowances, and tax holidays.
31. This shock is implemented as a positive increase in the AS ﬁscal deﬁcit above 4 percent
of GDP in the ﬁrst year, which declines to 1.0 percent of GDP by the end of the ninth year.
Afterwards, it reverts to the deﬁcit consistent with the original long-run debt target of 24 per-
cent of GDP. At the same time, world preferences for Asian imports shift up by 5 percentage
points of their total imports by moving the bias parameters for imported consumption goods
(b A in eq. 4) and investment goods (bE) over roughly three years. For example, the bias of
American consumers for imported goods from AS (bA
US,AS) increases from 0.11 to 0.16, with a
corresponding decrease in demand for imported goods from RC (bA
US,RC) from 0.58 to 0.53.
This implies that in the long run, for every additional 100 units of imports in JE, RW or US,
ﬁve of those units now come from AS rather than from the other trading partners.Fig. 10.14 Emerging Asia—Positive ﬁscal policy shock in emerging Asia, includ-
ing export subsidiesFig. 10.15 Rest of the world—Positive ﬁscal policy shock in emerging Asia,
including export subsidiesrates worldwide. Also, the shift in world preferences toward AS imports
means there is now a higher degree of openness between AS and the rest of
the world. So when all six shocks are combined to form the baseline scenario,
responses of trade movements to the various shocks are higher vis-à-vis AS
(and they are, to varying degrees, less among the other regional blocs).
10.4.2 The Integrated Scenario
The six aforementioned shocks form the components for our integrated
baseline scenario. As alluded to, the shocks should be viewed as the central
tendencies of the scenario, while the latter is presented more broadly as a
range of potential outcomes. Indeed, over time there has been considerable
uncertainty about the evolution and correction of the U.S. current account
imbalance, and there is no basis to assume that this will not be the case in
the future. Figure 10.16 demonstrates this point by showing the evolution
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Fig. 10.16 Forecasts from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, 1999 to 2005—
United Statesof the IMF’s forecasts in its World Economic Outlook, from 1999 to the
present. In later forecasts we see the same basic story as the one we are pro-
posing. Earlier forecasts put more weight on beliefs that the U.S. current
account deﬁcit was caused by high investment rates, rather than low
private savings and large public dissaving. We can also observe that con-
sumption continues to trend upward over time, but in later forecasts there
is a need for a notable correction toward the end of the forecast horizon.
In presenting the baseline scenario, we therefore consider a range of pos-
sibilities that accounts for the degree of uncertainty around the central ten-
dency of the six component shocks already outlined. A high degree of un-
certainty, in particular, surrounds the outcome of shocks related to private
savings in the United States, rest of world preferences for holdings of US
assets, and the positive productivity shock in AS. For the outcome of
shocks related to the US ﬁscal policy and lagging productivity in JE, the
uncertainty bounds are more narrow.
The baseline scenario begins in the ﬁrst quarter of 2005. In order to
achieve the state of disequilibrium we believe exists in that period, we do
not start reporting from the initial steady state of the model, but rather
from period 13 (i.e., the start of the fourth year) after the occurrence of
each of the shocks presented previously. We believe that using this time
frame for the combination of the six shocks (with minor modiﬁcations to
smooth demand and monetary policy) is the best strategy to represent our
baseline view of the world economy at the beginning of 2005.
Figure 10.17presents the baseline scenario in the United States. The key
features are a gradual build up in government debt and decline in net for-
eign assets for US. The exchange rate depreciates gradually to allow the net
asset position to stabilize. This generates the trade surplus required to ﬁ-
nance the interest obligations resulting from the increase in net foreign li-
abilities. Consumption as a share of GDP is higher in the short run but is
eventually crowded out as US becomes more heavily indebted. In addition,
investment is crowded out by persistent budgetary deﬁcits. Overall, the dy-
namics in the United States are driven by the current account deﬁcit mod-
erating from more than 5 percent of GDP to a sustainable level in ten years’
time.
Emerging Asia’s most important role in the baseline is through its ab-
sorption of the increased supply of US assets (ﬁgure 10.18). Initially AS
runs a large and growing current account surplus. Eventually, the trade
balance turns negative to support the large increase in the net foreign asset
position. To absorb the inﬂows from the interest payments on its net for-
eign asset position, the AS real eﬀective exchange rate roughly appreciates
between 10 and 20 percent over the next ﬁve years, achieved through higher
inﬂation. Because of limited exchange rate ﬂexibility, there is an increase in
the real interest rate necessary to defend the stability of the currency. Over-
all, the economy cools in the short run as higher interest rates dampen in-
Smooth Landing or Crash? Model-Based Scenarios 411Fig. 10.17 The baseline scenario—United StatesFig. 10.18 The baseline scenario—Emerging Asiavestment and real appreciation aﬀects net exports. However, consumption
increases as a share of GDP in the medium term in anticipation of higher
wealth (and lower saving) in the long run.
Japan and the euro area are relatively stable in terms of adjustment, ex-
periencing few eﬀects as AS absorbs most of the increased US demand for
goods and the increased supply of US assets (ﬁgure 10.19). The JE exter-
nal account is broadly stable going forward, with only a temporary and
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Fig. 10.19 The baseline scenario—Japan and the euro areasmall current account improvement until it stabilizes around 0.5 percent of
GDP in about ten years’ time.
The RC bloc is not a key part of either the baseline scenario or the alter-
native scenarios presented in the following. It behaves much like AS be-
cause it has strong links with the United States (mainly Canada and Mex-
ico). But RC absorbs less US debt as there is no large underlying positive
shock to its preference for US assets. Furthermore, it experiences relatively
little inﬂation and has a smaller movement in its real eﬀective exchange rate
than AS because it conducts its monetary policy by targeting inﬂation
rather than a nominal exchange rate peg.
10.5 Elements for Alternative Scenarios
This section has two objectives. First, we consider some scenarios that are
designed to highlight the potential risks of large current account imbal-
ances. Second, we discuss some possible solutions that may mitigate these
risks. In summary, we argue that the short-run output costs for the U.S.
economy associated with ﬁnancial market turbulence and a sudden loss in
appetite for U.S. assets are likely to be the same order of magnitude as a
large, credible ﬁscal consolidation that would make a signiﬁcant contribu-
tion to reducing these imbalances steadily over time and make both the U.S.
and world economy less susceptible to shocks. We also consider the eﬀects
of competition friendly structural policies aimed at reducing long-standing
structural rigidities and distortions in the product markets in Europe and
Japan. Our analysis suggests that such policies could play a meaningful role
in reducing current account imbalances on a sustainable basis.
10.5.1 Sudden Loss in Appetite for U.S. Assets
Among the major risks surrounding the large buildup of U.S. external li-
abilities, there has been considerable discussion that a sudden loss in ap-
petite for these assets by the rest of the world could precipitate a large and
abrupt depreciation in the U.S. dollar, adversely impact interest rates, and
cause signiﬁcant second-round negative eﬀects on other countries. We at-
tempt to evaluate these predictions.
Initially, we consider the eﬀects of a sudden portfolio reshuﬄing in the
rest of the world (AS, JE, and RC blocs) under the assumption that AS
maintains a peg relative to the US currency. The eﬀects of this ﬁrst scenario
are reported as solid lines in ﬁgure 10.20. Next, we consider the same sce-
nario, but in this case central banks in AS gradually adopt a ﬂexible ex-
change rate regime (and inﬂation targeting).32 The eﬀects of this second
scenario are reported as dashed lines in ﬁgure 10.20 and serve to illustrate
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32. Technically, this is made operational by shifting the parameters in the reaction function
for AS gradually over time to be consistent with the parameters in the other country blocs of
the model.how ﬂexibility in the exchange rate can help reduce variability in both out-
put and inﬂation in AS.
If market sentiment soured on dollar assets, higher real interest rates in
the United States and a signiﬁcant depreciation in the US dollar in eﬀec-
tive terms would result. Dollar depreciation would improve the US trade
balance but have a contractionary eﬀect on US GDP growth as higher real
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Fig. 10.20 Loss of appetite for US assets—Benign scenario where the U.S. current
account deﬁcit declines by 1.5 percentage points: Exchange peg in emerging Asia
(solid lines) and move to ﬂexible exchange rates in emerging Asia (dashed lines;
deviation from baseline)interest rates have a larger depressing eﬀect on domestic demand than the
eﬀect of the real exchange rate depreciation. Interestingly, this analysis
suggests a fairly benign scenario in partner countries where growth rises
temporarily in response to lower real interest rates.
These scenarios seem consistent with a view that adjustment in relative
prices and real interest rates may not have enormous implications for the
world economy as a whole, insofar as the adjustment process was orderly
and did not yield persistently higher real interest rates in the rest of the
world. It is important to note that these simulations assume relatively high
elasticities of substitution between domestically produced tradables and
importables. Reducing these elasticities to one approximately doubles the
real depreciation in the U.S. dollar, but has much smaller eﬀects on the
other results reported in ﬁgure 10.20 as the exchange rate simply has to do
more work to reequilibrate the economies to move U.S. dollar asset hold-
ings toward their new desired levels.33
Beneﬁts of Exchange Rate Flexibility in Emerging Asia
While the eﬀects appear somewhat benign for the world economy gen-
erally, they would be anything but benign for the regional economies in AS
that exhibit symptoms of overheating. In this scenario one can see the po-
tential beneﬁts of allowing greater exchange rate ﬂexibility in AS as a way
to reduce variability in both output and inﬂation. Indeed, a comparison of
the solid lines and the dashed lines in ﬁgure 10.20 shows intensifying pres-
sure on domestic inﬂation and output, associated with a reduction in de-
mand for US assets by AS central banks, if they (perhaps, paradoxically)
kept trying to peg their exchange rates to the US dollar.34
In the ﬁrst case, attempting to maintain the peg would generate signiﬁ-
cant overheating pressures and higher inﬂation, as accelerating prices
would be the only method to appreciate their real exchange rates toward
values in line with underlying fundamentals. In the second case, we allow
the weight on the exchange rate in the AS monetary policy reaction func-
tion to fall gradually over time and at the same time the weight on (ex-
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33. Our baseline elasticities are in line with the parameters used in standard open-economy
models, but they are signiﬁcantly higher than the midpoint of the range of macroeconomet-
ric estimates, which falls closer to one. For example, Bergin (2004) ﬁnds evidence for a unitary
elasticity. See Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) for a stylized model with a unit elasticity of substi-
tution between home and foreign goods, complete pass-through, and home bias in govern-
ment spending. More complex simulation models such as Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005)
and Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti (2004) employ estimates of 2.5 and 3.0, respectively, closer
to estimates of long-run elasticities based on disaggregated data. It is important to note that
estimates around 2.5 combined with adjustment costs on imports results in dynamic re-
sponses for imports that are consistent with typical impulse response functions over one- to
two-year horizons.
34. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) argue that diversiﬁcation of foreign re-
serves by Asian central banks, amounting to sterilized intervention to weaken the dollar,
would be incompatible unless these central banks changed their (ﬁxed) exchange rate policies.pected) inﬂation to rise. Consequently, the real exchange rate depreciates
by less in AS, and this results in less variability in output and inﬂation.35
Are These Scenarios Too Benign?
Possibly. The conundrum of historically low interest rates, against the
backdrop of historically strong global growth and U.S. monetary tighten-
ing, is far from being well understood. And uncertainty lingers about the
sustainability and vulnerability of prevailing relaxed ﬁnancial conditions.
Correspondingly, there is a clear and present risk that real rates may rise
universally if a sharp U.S. dollar depreciation were to precipitate a re-
assessment of global risks, including for inﬂation. This could also trigger
adjustments in the prices of other assets (such as housing and equities) and
bring into play conﬁdence eﬀects with further reverberations throughout
the economy.
To elaborate on these risks, we consider a scenario (see ﬁgure 10.21)
where additional ramiﬁcations of a sharp decline in market sentiment to-
ward abundant US dollar assets are considered. In this case, global inﬂa-
tion fears and pressures emerge and interest rates tend to rise signiﬁcantly
across markets. Emerging Asia attempts to contain the overheating pres-
sures from past low real exchange rates through revaluation and sharply
higher interest rates. For other countries, inﬂationary pressures are exac-
erbated as the competitive forces from cheap AS exports recede. In this
case, note that the adverse eﬀects on global growth are signiﬁcant.
10.5.2 Reducing Budget Deﬁcits in the United States
In a recent model-based analysis of current account imbalances, Erceg,
Guerrieri, and Gust (2005) suggest that ﬁscal deﬁcits do not have very sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects on current account deﬁcits.36 The implication is that a large
reduction in the U.S. government deﬁcits would not play a major role in
correcting current account imbalances. But this analysis relies on a single,
narrow mechanism (i.e., liquidity constraints) through which ﬁscal vari-
ables might operate (beyond tax distortions), while other theoretical
frameworks—and other models—reach rather diﬀerent conclusions. This
is the case, for instance, with simulation results based on the aforemen-
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35. We acknowledge that the diﬀerence between the scenarios is not large. It would be much
larger if we assumed there was an immediate move to a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. We show
some results below for a US ﬁscal experiment that better contrasts the diﬀerences between a
pure exchange rate peg and a pure ﬂexible exchange rate regime in the AS bloc.
36. Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005) add rule-of-thumb consumers to a model based on
the representative agent paradigm and then use the model to study the eﬀects of recent U.S.
ﬁscal deﬁcits on the current account deﬁcit. The eﬀects they ﬁnd are much smaller than in
models allowing for the possibility that permanent increases in government debt can have
permanent consequences on the stock of NFLs. Faruqee and Laxton (2000) show that liq-
uidity-constrained consumers by themselves do not result in signiﬁcant long-term crowding-
out eﬀects associated with permanent increases in government debt.tioned GFM, a multicountry choice-theoretic model—in the life cycle,
overlapping generations tradition—that has been developed speciﬁcally to
study the medium- and long-term consequences of alternative ﬁscal poli-
cies that involve permanent changes in government debt.37
The theoretical framework adopted in this paper provides a synthesis
between these disparate modeling strategies by considering the link be-
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Fig. 10.21 More painful current account reversal (deviation from baseline)
37. For an introduction to the structure and properties of the IMF’s GFM, see Botman and
others (2006) and Kumhof, Laxton, and Muir (2005). The model assumes that prices and
wages are perfectly ﬂexible but has a well-deﬁned steady state where private- and public-
sector preferences determine if countries are net creditors or debtors.tween government debt and net asset positions in relation to the technol-
ogy of ﬁnancial intermediation.38 When this link is switched oﬀ, and no al-
lowance is made for the possibility that permanent changes in government
debt can result in a permanent shift in the desired level of NFLs, our sim-
ulation results show that the eﬀects of ﬁscal deﬁcits on current account
deﬁcits can be very small. However, when the link is explicitly and realisti-
cally taken into account, our results predict a rather diﬀerent path for cur-
rent account rebalancing.
Eﬀects of a Permanent Reduction in Government Debt through Tax Hikes
Figure 10.22 reports the results for a US ﬁscal consolidation scenario
where the government debt-to-GDP ratio is reduced by 60 percentage
points in the long run by increasing taxes by 3 percent of GDP over ﬁfteen
years. The tax hike is assumed to fall entirely on labor income, but after the
ﬁfteenth year of the simulation, the tax rate is allowed to fall in order to sta-
bilize the government debt ratio at a value that is 60 percentage points be-
low baseline.
The solid line in ﬁgure 10.22 reports the results when the AS currencies
are assumed to be pegged to the dollar, while the dashed lines refer to the
case in which they have a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. In both cases out-
put growth falls in the United States and the current account balance im-
proves signiﬁcantly. The contractionary eﬀects on real GDP are moderated
by a real depreciation in the US dollar. These simulations show clearly that
US ﬁscal consolidation would not be achieved without some short-run
costs for output growth, but unlike the results by Erceg, Guerrieri, and
Gust (2005), they suggest that a large and credible ﬁscal consolidation
could have large and durable beneﬁts by reducing current account imbal-
ances.
The dashed lines report the results when the AS countries no longer im-
port an inappropriate monetary stance by pegging their exchange rates to
the US dollar. In the case of a peg, their real exchange rate depreciates with
the US dollar, and real interest rates decline. This results in a signiﬁcant ex-
pansion in demand in the short run and higher inﬂation. In the case where
they are assumed to follow a ﬂexible exchange rate regime, there is sub-
stantially less variability in output and inﬂation as the real exchange rate is
allowed to appreciate in line with fundamentals. Note that the rest of the
world (Japan, Europe, and RC) beneﬁts from ﬁscal consolidation in the
United States as the rise in world savings results in lower real interest rates
and higher investment.
The ﬁscal scenarios reported above allow the desired level of net foreign
liabilities to fall by one half of the decline in government debt while in
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38. The section on the budget constraint for the Ricardian households in the Appendix ex-
plains more fully the implementation of these linkages.Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005) this mechanism does not exist. To see the
importance of this assumption for our results we have constructed two al-
ternative scenarios, one that employs a lower estimate of one-fourth and
another that employs an estimate of three-fourths—see ﬁgure 10.23. Not
surprisingly, this parameter has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the path of the cur-
rent account balance. In the limiting case when it is assumed to be zero, the
eﬀects on the current account balance over the medium term become in-
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Fig. 10.22 Eﬀects of a permanent reduction in government debt through tax hikes:
Exchange rate peg in emerging Asia (solid lines) and move to ﬂexible exchange rates
in emerging Asia (dashed lines; deviation from baseline)Fig. 10.23 Eﬀects of a permanent reduction in government debt through tax hikes:
Sensitivity analysis with alternative assumptions on the link between government
debt and net foreign liabilities (deviations from baseline)signiﬁcant. Indeed, in the long run the eﬀects would be absolutely zero as
the relationship between current account deﬁcit and ﬁscal deﬁcit, mea-
sured as ratios of nominal GDP, will be exactly the same as the relationship
between the stocks of net foreign liabilities and government debt.
Alternative Views about the Link between 
Government Debt and Net Foreign Liabilities
As a check of the reliability of our simulations, it is worthwhile to inves-
tigate what assumptions may point to larger or smaller estimates in mod-
els where the relationship between government debt and NFLs is modeled
endogenously and falls directly out of assumptions about behavior. The
aforementioned GFM is based on an overlapping generations framework
with ﬁnite lives and potential myopia in consumer spending decisions be-
cause the planning horizon can be set to be shorter than the expected life-
time of an average consumer. An important consequence of these assump-
tions is that there will be a strong link in the long run between government
debt and the stock of NFLs.
Figure 10.24 presents results for the same ﬁscal consolidation experi-
ment considered in the preceding. We consider two cases. The ﬁrst assumes
a planning horizon of ten years (solid lines) while the second assumes a
planning horizon of twenty years (dashed lines). Note that in both cases
there are signiﬁcant eﬀects on the current account balance from perma-
nently reducing government debt. In the ﬁrst case, the current account bal-
ance improves by about 2.0 percentage points, while in the second case
when the planning horizon is twenty years it improves by about 1.5 per-
centage points.
It is important to emphasize that the improvements in the current ac-
count balance are durable to the extent that there is a permanent reduction
in net foreign liabilities of 40 and 30 percentage points, respectively.
Kumhof, Laxton, and Muir (2005) show that the long-run elasticity be-
tween the stock of government debt and NFLs in GFM ranges from a low
of 0.50 to a high of 0.75 for plausible assumptions about structural pa-
rameters such as the planning horizon of agents, the type of ﬁscal consoli-
dation (labor taxes, corporate income taxes, or government absorption),
and key elasticities (especially intertemporal substitution).
Does the Eﬀect on the Current Account Depend on the Type of
Fiscal Consolidation?
Yes. The eﬀects on the current account balance will generally be larger if
the ﬁscal consolidation is a result of a cut in government absorption rather
than an increase in taxes. Figure 10.25 compares the same tax-induced ﬁs-
cal consolidation reported earlier (solid lines) with an alternative ﬁscal
consolidation where government absorption is cut by 3 percentage points
of GDP for ﬁfteen years (dashed lines). In the short run, expenditure cuts
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well as larger eﬀects on the current account balance.
10.5.3 How Much Would Structural Reforms in 
Japan and the Euro Area Contribute?
Given the uneven pattern of global growth and demand and the sluggish
economic performance in JE, it has been suggested that one component
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Fig. 10.24 Eﬀects of a permanent reduction in government debt through tax hikes:
Sensitivity analysis using GFM comparing a planning horizon of ten years (solid
lines) with a planning horizon of twenty years (dashed lines; deviations from
baseline)solution to help reduce global imbalances would be to raise the growth po-
tential—hampered by deep-seated structural rigidities—in these regions
through further structural reforms. Namely, policies aimed at lowering
barriers to competition, enhancing ﬂexibility in employment and produc-
tion practices, raising labor utilization, and reducing distortions in labor
and product markets could substantially improve growth prospects, boost
domestic demand, and attract foreign investors. Some have challenged the
notion that structural reforms would do much at all and may even exacer-
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Fig. 10.25 Eﬀects of a permanent reduction in government debt through tax hikes
(solid lines) and expenditure cuts (dashed lines; deviations from baseline)bate global imbalances, given that they may weigh on consumer conﬁdence
(and spending) over drawn-out transitions typical of structural change
episodes.
To evaluate these viewpoints, we study scenarios of reducing labor and
product market distortions (i.e., markups) in JE following Bayoumi, Lax-
ton, and Pesenti (2004). Labor market reforms alone (not shown) can have
minimal eﬀects on reducing high domestic net saving, particularly if un-
certainty over reforms further weighed on households. However, credible
product market reforms can oﬀer strong complementary eﬀects enhanc-
ing the impact of labor market reforms on growth and employment (and
thereby conﬁdence).39Moreover, the direct output eﬀects from comparable
product market reforms tend to be larger. Considering these reforms, ﬁg-
ure 10.26shows the eﬀects of reducing price markups in both the tradables
and nontradables sectors in JE gradually to US levels over a ten-year pe-
riod. Growth rises signiﬁcantly in JE with some small spillovers to the rest
of the world. Note that accommodative monetary policy in JE lends fur-
ther support to domestic demand during the structural adjustment toward
higher economic activity.
The simulations presented in ﬁgure 10.26 include a permanent 6 per-
centage point reduction in the desired NFA to GDP ratios—akin to the im-
plications of higher productivity—in JE as well as an increase in desired
NFA positions in other countries. The solid lines are based on the shifts in
the long-run desired NFA positions that obtain under the same simulation
experiment in GFM, while the dashed lines assumes that the United States
alone would ﬁnance the increase in investment in JE through an increase
in its desired NFA holdings. Obviously, if the eﬀects on growth were more
sustained and trend productivity growth were to increase, there could be
even larger changes in the desired NFA positions.
10.6 Conclusion
Global imbalances are a complex, multifaceted issue, with potentially
far-reaching implications for the global economy that should not be ig-
nored. Concern about potential scenarios where the adjustment process
could be costly to both the United States and the world economy has mo-
tivated several policymakers and analysts to demand credible and swift ac-
tion to help mitigate the risks by reducing the magnitude of these imbal-
ances. While predicting their future evolution cannot be done with any
certitude, a better understanding of the likely conditions, causes, and con-
sequences surrounding these external developments can guide key policies
needed to help navigate economies toward a desirable resolution. Examin-
ing the implications, risks, and attendant policies attached to global rebal-
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39. See, for example, IMF (2005) for evidence based on OECD countries.ancing through the lens of a dynamic, multiregion model of the global
economy, this analysis has yielded some useful insights in this regard.
Our baseline view is that steady global rebalancing with an orderly un-
winding of ﬁnancial positions and currency realignments—notably a
gradual depreciation in the U.S. dollar—can be achieved. The challenge for
policymakers at the national level is to help ensure this outcome that is in
the collective interest. In this instance, the burden of adjustment will
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Fig. 10.26 Estimated eﬀects of more competition friendly policies in Japan and the
euro area: Financed by all other regional blocs (solid lines) and ﬁnanced only by the
United States (dashed lines; deviations from baseline)largely fall on the United States and AS in terms of reversing their past
(net) national saving trends. This may require a committed U.S. ﬁscal con-
solidation through a combination of higher taxes and reining in govern-
ment absorption. Supportive ﬁscal policies in AS, aimed at easing export
competitiveness strains, could facilitate adjustment, aided by greater ex-
change rate ﬂexibility that limited output and inﬂation variability. Al-
though more uncertain, some normalization of private consumption rates
(in opposing directions) in the two regions would further facilitate external
adjustment.
Europe and Japan, for their part, could meaningfully contribute to the
multilateral adjustment process through stronger pursuit of growth-
enhancing structural reforms that align with their own national interests.
Namely, policies aimed at addressing long-standing structural rigidities and
distortions could substantially improve growth prospects, strengthen con-
sumption and investment spending, and increase the attractiveness to foreign
investors. Labor market reforms alone might not signiﬁcantly contribute to
rebalancing, especially if uncertainty about policy direction and resolve
weighed on conﬁdence. However, committed product market initiatives could
complement these reforms to enhance conﬁdence and further raise growth
and domestic demand. Led by these competition friendly reforms and with
structural adjustment supported by monetary policy, credible growth-
enhancing measures tackling deep-seated structural impediments and dis-
tortions would boost domestic consumption and investment prospects, at-
tract foreign capital, and thereby contribute to external rebalancing.
Far less benign adjustment scenarios are also quite conceivable. A more
dangerous route, in the absence of underlying, broad-based adjustment in
macroeconomic and structural policies, would rely on global ﬁnancial
markets to take a lead role. If mounting concerns over imbalances trig-
gered sizable international portfolio shifts, a sudden loss of appetite for
U.S. dollar assets could eﬀect more drastic changes in interest and ex-
change rates, including a signiﬁcantly weaker U.S. dollar. This is particu-
larly the case if relaxed ﬁnancial conditions were to give way, with harmful




The structure of the model has been introduced in section 10.2 and il-
lustrated in ﬁgure 10.2. Needless to say, the model is fairly complex even
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modities and other upstream intermediate inputs, distribution costs,40 as
well as balance-sheet and revaluation eﬀects stemming from asymmetries
in the currency denomination of assets and liabilities across countries) of
obvious relevance for the analysis of the international transmission mech-
anism. In what follows we provide a brief but comprehensive overview of
the model. In some sections we focus on country-speciﬁc equations that are
independent of foreign variables, thus qualitatively similar across coun-
tries. We therefore drop country indexes for notational simplicity, with the
understanding that all four countries are analogously characterized. In the
sections involving international transactions, instead, we explicitly incor-
porate country indexes in our notation. As a general convention through-
out the model, when we state that variable Xfollows an autoregressive pro-
cess, we mean that
(A1) Xt   (1    X)X    XXt 1   eX,t,
where 0    X   1, X is the steady-state value of Xt, and eX,t is a shock.
Final Goods
In each country there is a continuum of symmetric ﬁrms producing the
two ﬁnal goods, A (the consumption good) and E (the investment good)
under perfect competition.
Consider ﬁrst the consumption sector. Each ﬁrm is indexed by x ∈ [0, s],
where 0  s 1 is the country size. Firm x’s output at time (quarter) tis de-
noted At(x). The consumption good is produced with the following nested
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology:
(A2) At(x)1 (1/eA)   (1    A,t)1/eAN A,t(x)1 (1/eA)    A,t
1/eA[ A
1/ AQA,t(x)1 (1/ A)
  (1    A)1/ AM A,t(x)1 (1/ A)]{[ A/( A 1)][1 (1/eA)]}
Three intermediate inputs are used in the production of the consumption
good A: a basket N A of nontradable goods, a basket QA of domestic trad-
able goods, and a basket M A of imported goods. The elasticity of substi-
tution between tradables and nontradables is e A   0, and the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and imported tradables is  A   0, and
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported tradables is
 A   0. The weights of the three inputs are, respectively, 1 –  A,  A  A and
 A(1 –   A) with 0    A,   A   1.
Firm x takes as given the prices of the three inputs and minimizes its
costs subject to the technological constraint (A2). As a convention
throughout the model, A is the numeraire of the economy, and all national
prices are expressed in terms of domestic consumption units, that is, rela-
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40. The reader interested in these two features is referred to the variant of the model con-
sidered in Laxton and Pesenti (2003).tive to the Consumer Price Index (CPI).41 Cost minimization implies that
ﬁrm x’s demands for intermediate inputs are
(A3) N A,t(x)   (1    A,t)pN,t
 eAAt(x)








where pN, p Q and p MA are the relative prices of the inputs in terms of con-
sumption baskets and pXA is the price of the composite basket of domestic
and foreign tradables, or
(A6) pXA,t   [  ApQ,t
1  A   (1    A)pMA,t
1  A]1/(1  A).
The technologies of production of consumption and investment goods
can be quantitatively diﬀerent but their formal characterizations are simi-
lar, with self-explanatory changes in notation. For instance, a ﬁrm e∈[0,s],
that produces the investment good, demands nontradable goods according
to
(A7) N E,t(e)   (1    E,t) Et.
Note that pMA and p ME are sector speciﬁc as they reﬂect the diﬀerent com-
position of imports in the two sectors, while pN and p Q are identical across
sectors.
Demand for Domestic Intermediate Goods
Consider now the composition of the baskets of intermediate goods. In-
termediate inputs come in diﬀerent varieties (brands) and are produced un-
der conditions of monopolistic competition. In each country there are two
kinds of intermediate goods, tradables and nontradables. Each kind is de-
ﬁned over a continuum of mass s. Without loss of generality, we assume
that each nontradable good is produced by a single domestic ﬁrm indexed
by n ∈ [0, s], and each tradable good is produced by a ﬁrm h ∈ [0, s].
Focusing ﬁrst on the basket N A, this is a CES index of all domestic vari-
eties of nontradables. Denoting as N A(n, x) the demand by ﬁrm x of an in-
termediate good produced by ﬁrm n, the basket N A(x) is




N A,t(n, x)1 (1/ N,t)dn 
 N,t/( N,t 1)
,
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41. The transformation of all prices in relative terms and all quantities in detrended terms
is motivated by the desire to avoid dealing with unit roots, either nominal or real, in quanti-
tative simulations of the model over very long time horizons.Firm xtakes as given the prices of the nontradable goods p(n). Cost min-
imization implies
(A9) N A,t(n, x)     
  N,t
N A,t(x),
where pN is the price of one unit of the nontradable basket, or
(A10) pN,t       
s
0
pt(n)1  N,tdn 
1/(1  N,t)
.
The basket NEis similarly characterized. Aggregating across ﬁrms,42and
accounting for public demand of nontradables—here assumed to have the





N A,t(n, x)dx   
s
0
N E,t(n, e)de   GN,t(n) 
   
  N,t
(N A,t   NE,t   GN,t).
Following the same steps, we can derive the domestic demand schedules for




QA,t(h, x)dx   
s
0
QE,t(h, e)de    
  T,t
(QA,t   QE,t).
Demand for Imports
The derivation of the foreign demand schedule for good h is analytically
more complex but, as we show in (A21) at the end of this section, it shares
the same functional form as (A11) and (A12) and can be written as a func-
tion of the relative price of good h(with elasticity  T,t) and total foreign de-
mand for imports.
Let’s focus ﬁrst on import demand in the consumption-good sector. Be-
cause we deal with goods produced in diﬀerent countries, we need to in-
troduce explicit country indexes in our notation. Thus, in this section we
will refer to a speciﬁc country as H, to the other countries as CO   H, and
to the representative ﬁrm in the consumption sector as xH ∈ [0, sH]. Its im-
ports MA
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42. The convention throughout the model is that variables that are not explicitly indexed
(to ﬁrms or households) are expressed in per capita (average) terms. For instance, At   (1/s)
∫s
0 At(x)dx.(A14) 0   bH,CO   1, ∑
CO H
bH,CO   1.
In (A13),  A
H is the elasticity of import substitution across countries: the
higher is  A
H, the easier it is for ﬁrm xHto substitute imports from one coun-
try with imports from another. The parameters bA
H,CO determine the com-
position of the import basket across countries. MA
H,CO(xH) denotes imports
of country H’s ﬁrm xH from country CO.
The response of imports to changes in fundamentals and their price elas-
ticities are typically observed to be smaller in the short term than in the
long run. To model realistic dynamics of imports volumes (such as delayed
and sluggish adjustment to changes in relative prices), we assume that im-
ports are subject to adjustment costs  MA
H,CO. These costs are speciﬁed in
terms of import shares relative to ﬁrm xH’s output and can be diﬀerent





such that  MA
H,CO(1)   0,  MA
H,CO( )    MA
H,CO/2 and  MA





H,COthe price in country H of a basket of intermediate inputs








where    MA
H,CO(xH) is the ﬁrst derivative of  MA
H,CO(xH) with respect to
MA
H,CO(xH). The import price in the consumption sector, pH












In principle, the cost-minimizing import price pH
MA(xH) is ﬁrm speciﬁc, as
it depends on ﬁrm xH’s import share. To the extent that all ﬁrms xHare sym-
pM,t
H,CO
    
1    MA,t









H,CO(xH)[1    MA,t
H,CO(xH)]
     
[1    MA,t
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43. Relative to the quadratic speciﬁcation adopted, for example, in Laxton and Pesenti
(2003), this parameterization of import adjustment costs allows the nonlinear model to deal
with potentially large shocks.metric within the consumption sector, however, there will be a unique im-
port price pH
MA.44
Let’s now consider the basket MA
H,CO(xH) in some detail. In analogy with
(A8), it is a CES index of all varieties of tradable intermediate goods pro-
duced by ﬁrms hCO operating in country CO and exported to country H.
Denoting as MA
H,CO(hCO, xH) the demand by ﬁrm xH of an intermediate
good produced by ﬁrm hCO, the basket MA
H,CO(xH) is
(A18) MA,t















CO   1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate trad-
ables, the same elasticity entering (A12) in country CO.
The cost-minimizing ﬁrm xH takes as given the prices of the imported
goods pH(hCO) and determines its demand of good hCO according to
(A19) MA,t






H,CO(xH) has been deﬁned in (A16) and pM
H,CO is
(A20) pM,t









The import demand schedules in the investment-good sector can be de-
rived in perfect analogy with the preceding analysis. As a last step, we can
derive country CO’s demand schedule for country H’s intermediate good
hH, that is, the analog of (A12). Aggregating across ﬁrms (and paying at-















CO,H   M E,t
CO,H)
Supply of Intermediate Goods
The nontradable n is produced with the following CES technology:
(A22) Nt(n)   ZN,t[(1    N)1/ N t(n)1 (1/ N)    N
1/ NKt(n)1 (1/ N)] N/( N 1)
Firm n uses labor  (n) and capital K(n) to produce N(n) units of its variety.
 N   0 is the elasticity of input substitution, and ZN is a productivity shock
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44. It follows that pH
MAMA
H   ΣCO H pM
H,COMA
H,CO(1 –  MA




45. Recall that a productivity shock is deﬁned as a deviation from the common world trend.
Variants of the model allow for the possibility of shocks to labor productivity or capital pro-
ductivity instead of total factor productivity.Deﬁning as wt and r t the prices of labor and capital, the marginal cost in
nontradables production is46
(A23) mct(n)   ,
and the capital-labor ratio is
(A24)     
  N
.
Labor inputs are diﬀerentiated and come in diﬀerent varieties (skills).
They are deﬁned over a continuum of mass equal to the country size and
indexed by j ∈ [0, s]. Each ﬁrm n uses a CES combination of labor inputs




 (n, j)1 (1/ t)dj 
 t/( t 1)
,
where  (n, j) is the demand of labor input of type j by the producer of good
n, and   1 is the elasticity of substitution among labor inputs. Cost min-
imization implies that  (n, j) is a function of the relative wage
(A26)  t(n, j)        
  t
 t(n),
where w( j) is the wage paid to labor input j, and the wage index wis deﬁned
as
(A27) wt       
s
0
wt( j)1  tdj 
1/(1  t)
.
Similar considerations hold for the production of tradables. We denote
by T(h) the supply of each intermediate tradable h. Using self-explanatory
notation, we have
(A28) T t(h)   ZT,t[(1    T)1/ T t(h)1 (1/ T)    T
1/ TKt(h)1 (1/ T)] T/( T 1),
where ZT is an autoregressive process (in logarithm). Aggregating across




 t(n, j)dn   
s
0
 t(h, j)dh 
   
  t      
s
0
 t(n)dn   
s
0
 t(h)dh     
  t
 t,
























 N  




[(1    N)wt
1  N    Nrt
1  N]1/(1  N)
    
ZN,t
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46. Following the notational convention regarding prices, mct, wt, and rt denote marginal
costs, wages, and rental rates in consumption units.Price Setting in the Nontradables Sector
Consider now proﬁt maximization in the intermediate nontradables sec-
tor. Each ﬁrm n takes into account the demand (A11) for its product and
sets its nominal price by maximizing the present discounted value of real
proﬁts. There are costs of nominal price adjustment measured in terms of
total proﬁts forgone. The adjustment cost is denoted   PN,t[pt(n), pt–1(n)].47






Dt,  t, gt, [p (n)   mc (n)] 
   
  N, 
(N A,    N E,    GN, )[1    PN, (n)],
where Dt, (with Dt,t   1) is the appropriate discount rate, to be deﬁned in
equation (A48). As real variables are detrended and prices are deﬂated by
the CPI, equation (A30) includes  t, , the CPI inﬂation rate between time t
and time  , and gt, , the rate of growth of the global trend between t and  .
As ﬁrms n are symmetric and charge the same equilibrium price p(n)  
pN, the ﬁrst-order condition can be written as
(A31) 0   [1    PN,t(n)][pt(n)(1    N,t)    N,tmct(n)]   [pt(n)   mct(n)] 
  pt(n)   EtD t,t 1 t,t 1gt,t 1[ pt 1(n)   mct 1(n)]
  pt(n).
Interpreting the previous equation, when prices are fully ﬂexible (  PN   0),
the optimization problem collapses to the standard markup rule:
(A32) pt(n)   mct(n),
where the gross markup is a negative function of the elasticity of input sub-
stitution. Deviations from markup pricing occur if ﬁrms are penalized for
modifying their prices in the short term. The speed of adjustment in re-
sponse to shocks depends on the trade-oﬀ between current and future ex-
pected costs, making the price-setting process forward-looking.
 N,t  
 N,t  1
∂  PN,t 1  
∂pt(n)
N A,t 1   N E,t 1   GN,t 1    
N A,t   N E,t   GN,t
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47. It is worth emphasizing that the adjustment costs are related to changes in nominal
prices. However, the maximization problem can be carried out in terms of relative prices. In
fact, denote with GPN,t[P t(n), P t–1(n)] the adjustment cost as a function of nominal (i.e., non-
deﬂated by the CPI) prices P t(n) and P t–1(n), with GPN,t[P t(n), P t–1(n)]    PN,t[pt(n), pt–1(n)], and
express the price-setting problem in nominal terms. It is easy to verify that the ﬁrst-order con-
dition of the new problem coincides with (A31) as P t(n)∂GPN,t/∂P t(n)   pt(n)∂  PN,t/∂pt(n) and
P t(n)∂GPN,t 1(∂P t(n)   pt(n)∂  PN,t 1/∂pt(n).The speciﬁc parameterization we adopt allows the model to reproduce
realistic nominal dynamics:
(A33)   PN,t(n)     t 1,t   1 
2
The adjustment cost is related to changes of the nominal price of nontrad-
able n relative to the inﬂation target for the CPI, Πt–4,t. The inﬂation target
is speciﬁed in annualized terms (hence indexed by t– 4, t), while changes in
p(n) occur at a quarterly frequency.48 Underlying this speciﬁcation is the
notion that ﬁrms should not be penalized when their price hikes are in-
dexed to some (publicly observable) benchmark, such as the inﬂation tar-
get for the economy as a whole.
Price Setting in the Tradables Sector and Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Consider now the price-setting problem in the tradables sector. To the
extent that the four country blocs represent segmented markets in the
global economy, each ﬁrm hhas to set four prices, one in the domestic mar-
ket and the other three in the export markets. Exports are invoiced (and
prices are set) in the currency of the destination market. As we reintroduce
export markets, once again our notation needs to make explicit the coun-
try indexes. In what follows we use the index CO for a generic country and
denote as H the country where the exporting ﬁrm hH is located.
Accounting for (A21), the four price-setting problems of ﬁrm h in coun-










t, gt, [e 
H,COp 
CO(hH)   mc 
H(hH)] 





CO,H   ME, 
CO,H)[1    PM, 
CO,H(h)]
When H   CO, recall that pCO(hH) is the price of good hH in country CO,
pM
CO,H is the price of country CO’s imports from country H, and MA
CO,H  
ME
CO,H are country CO’s imports from country H. The term eH,COis the
bilateral real exchange rate between country H and country CO (an in-
crease in eH,CO represents a depreciation of country H’s currency
against country CO),49 and  PM
H,CO(hH) are adjustment costs related to














 PN  
2
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48. This speciﬁcation implies that the inﬂation target is known at any point in time. More
generally, the adjustment cost could be speciﬁed relative to any variable that converges as-
ymptotically to the steady-state inﬂation rate.
49. All exchange rates are quoted in real terms, that is, in relative consumption units. Of
course, eH,CO   1/eCO,H and eH,H   1.(A35)  PM,t
CO,H(hH)     CO
t 1,t   1 
2
For the domestic prices of tradables pH(hH) we still use (A34) with CO  
H, adopting the notational conventions pM
H,H   pQ
H, MA




H as described in (A12), and PM
H,H    H
PQ.
Despite its fastidiousness, the notation above is straightforward and the
equations are self-explanatory. Proﬁt maximization yields:
(A36) 0   [1    PM,t
CO,H(hH)][et
H,COpt
CO(hH)(1    H





CO(hH)   mct
H(hH)] pt
CO(hH)   Et DH
t,t 1 H
t,t 1gt,t 1
  [et 1
H,COpCO
t 1(hH)   mcH
t 1(hH)]   pt
CO(hH) 
If adjustment costs in the export market are highly relevant (that is, if the
 PM
CO,H coeﬃcient is relatively large), the prices of country H’s goods in the
foreign markets are characterized by signiﬁcant stickiness in local cur-
rency. In this case, the degree to which exchange rate movements (and
other shocks to marginal costs in country H) through import prices in
country CO is rather small. If instead the  PM
CO,H coeﬃcients are zero world-
wide, expression (A36) collapses to a markup rule under the law of one
price, and exchange rate pass-through is full:
(A37) pt
H,H(hH)   pH
Q,t   et
H,CO pt
CO(hH)   et
H,COpM,t
CO,H   mct
Consumer Preferences
In each country there is a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ [0, s],
the same index of labor inputs. Some households have access to capital
markets; some do not. The latter ﬁnance their consumption by relying ex-
clusively on their labor incomes. We refer to the ﬁrst type as Ricardian or
forward-looking; they represent a share (1 – sLC) of domestic households
and are indexed by j ∈ [0, s (1 – sLC)]. We refer to the second type as non-
Ricardian or liquidity-constrained; they represent a share sLC of domestic
households and are indexed by j ∈ [s(1 – sLC), s].
The speciﬁcation of households’ preferences adopts the GHH (1988)
utility function, adjusted for habit formation. Denoting with W t( j) the life-
time expected utility of household j, we have:
(A38) W t( j)   Et∑
 
  t
 t, gt, 




T,t   1
∂ CO,H




A,t 1   MCO,H
E,t 1   
MA,t
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and labor eﬀort  :
(A39) ut[Ct( j),  t( j)]   ZU 1       
       
1    
1   
In the preceding expressions,  t,  is the discount rate between time t and
time  , possibly diﬀerent across countries. As mentioned in section 10.2,
because of technological progress associated with home production activ-
ities (here related to the global trend), the term gt, 
1–  in (A38) implies that
the disutility of labor eﬀort increases with the common trend.50 The pa-
rameter   in (A38) and (A39) is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution. The parameter  , which aﬀects the curvature of labor
disutility, is the reciprocal of the Frisch elasticity.
There is habit persistence in consumption with coeﬃcient 0   bc   1.
The term Cj,t–1 in (A39) is past per capita consumption of household j’s
peers, (i.e., either forward-looking or liquidity-constrained agents). Simi-
larly, there is habit persistence in leisure with coeﬃcient 0   b    1.51 The
terms ZUand ZV are constants. Households’ preferences are therefore sym-
metric within their respective categories but, because of diﬀerent reference
groups in habit formation, they are not symmetric across categories.
Budget Constraint (Ricardian Households)
The individual ﬂow budget constraint for Ricardian agent j ∈ [0, (1 –
sLC)s] is
(A40) Bt( j)   etBt ∗(j)   (1   it 1) 
  (1   i∗
t 1)[1    B,t 1]
 (1    K,t)r tKt(j)  (1    L,t)wt(j) t(j)[1    W,t(j)] 
  Ct( j)   pE,tIt( j)    t(j)   TT t(j).
Households hold two nominal bonds, denominated in domestic and US








 t 1,tgt 1,t
 t( j)   b  j,t 1   
1   b 
ZV  
1   
Ct( j)   bcCj,t 1/gt 1,t    
1   bc/gt 1,t
1   bt  
1   
bc  
gt 1,t
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50. The restriction  t, gt, 
1–    1 is imposed to ensure that utility is bounded.
51. The instantaneous felicity is normalized such that in a steady state U, UC and U   can all
be written as constant  f(C,  ), where fis some function of steady-state consumption and la-
bor eﬀort, independent of the habit persistence coeﬃcients.
52. The choice of currency denomination of the international bond is arbitrary. With a
simple redeﬁnition of the relevant variables, one could think of B∗ in terms of any available
currency or basket of currencies.ings of domestic bond by household j, expressed in terms of domestic con-
sumption units, Bt ∗( j) is (detrended) holdings of the international bond,
expressed in terms of US consumption units, and et is the CPI-based real
exchange rate, expressed as the price of one US consumption basket in
terms of domestic consumption.53
The short-term nominal rates it and it ∗ are paid at the beginning of pe-
riod t   1 and are known at time t. The two rates are directly controlled by
their respective national governments. Only the US-currency bond is
traded internationally: the US bond is in zero net supply worldwide, while
the domestic bond is issued by the local government.54 It follows that the
net ﬁnancial wealth of Ricardian household j at time t is
(A41) F t( j)   (1   i∗
t 1)(1    B,t 1).
A ﬁnancial friction   B is introduced to guarantee that international net
asset positions follow a stationary process and the economies converge as-
ymptotically to a well-deﬁned steady state.55Agents who take a position in
the international bond market must deal with ﬁnancial intermediaries who
charge a transaction fee   B on sales or purchases of the international
bond.56 This transaction cost is a function of the average net asset position
of the whole economy. Speciﬁcally, we adopt the following functional
form:
(A42) 1    B,t   1    B1   ZB,t  ,
where 0    B1 1,  B2 0, and etB∗ (1/s)et∫0
s(1–sLC)B∗( j)djrepresents the
per capita net asset position of the country in consumption units. The term
b∗
FDES is the desired net asset position of the country expressed as a ratio of
GDP.57This variable measures the degree of international exposure that ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries consider appropriate for the economy, based on
their assessment of the economic outlook.
To understand the role played by   B, suppose ﬁrst that b∗
FDES   ZB   0





exp[ B2(etBt ∗/GDP t   b∗
FDES,t)]   1
    
exp[ B2(etBt ∗/GDP t   b∗
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53. It is understood that e is shorthand for eH,US, where H denotes the country under con-
sideration.
54. If the country under consideration is the US, e   1 and i   i∗.
55. See Ghironi, Talan, and Rebucci (2005) for an analysis of the steady-state distribution
of NFAs with heterogeneous discounting.
56. In our model it is assumed that all intermediation ﬁrms are owned by the country’s res-
idents and that their revenue is rebated to domestic households in a lump-sum fashion. A
simple variant of the model in which intermediation ﬁrms are owned by foreign residents
leaves the basic results virtually unchanged. There are no intermediation costs for US resi-
dents entering the international bond market, that is, there is no diﬀerence between onshore
and oﬀshore US interest rates.
57. The concept of GDP in our model will be discussed in the following with reference to
(A83).to its desired level of zero, it must be the case that   B   0 and the return on
the international bond is equal to 1   i∗. If the country is a net creditor
worldwide   B rises above zero, implying that the country’s households lose
an increasing fraction of their international bond returns to ﬁnancial in-
termediaries. When holdings of the international bond go to inﬁnity, the
return on the international bond approaches (1   i∗)(1 –  B1). By the same
token, if the country is a net debtor worldwide,   B falls from zero to – B1,
implying that households pay an increasing intermediation premium on
their international debt. When net borrowing goes to inﬁnity, the cost of
borrowing approaches (1   i∗)(1    B1). The parameter  B2 controls the
ﬂatness of the   B function: if  B2   0, then   B   0 regardless of the net asset
position; if  B2 tends to inﬁnity, then 1 –   B   (1 –  B1) for any arbitrarily
small net lending position, and 1 –   B   (1    B1) for any arbitrarily small
net borrowing position. An appropriate parameterization allows the
model to generate realistic dynamics for net asset positions and current ac-
count.
Consider now the other components of (A42). The variable ZB,t is a
shock.58 In our framework uncertainty in international ﬁnancial interme-
diation plays the same role that uncovered interest parity shocks or risk-
premium ﬂuctuations play in other open-economy models. Finally, when
rates of time preference diverge across countries and  ∗    , the transac-
tion cost is appropriately modiﬁed to account for asymmetries in real in-
terest rates across countries.
The term b∗
FDES can be positive or negative. The preceding considera-
tions are still valid after reinterpreting the concepts of net creditor or net
borrower in terms of deviations from the desired levels. The desired net as-
set position in country H is characterized as follows:
(A43) b∗H
FDES,t   b∗H





According to the previous expression, b∗H
FDESis a country-speciﬁc constant,
b∗H
FNEUT, adjusted to account for changes in the debt-to-GDP ratios in either
the domestic economy (BH/GDPH) or the rest of the world (BCO/GDPCO).
This speciﬁcation provides a plausible link between debt imbalances and
net asset positions. When the national debt-to-GDP ratio increases, do-
mestic agents reduce the share of foreign securities in their portfolios by
selling the international bond to foreigners. By the same token, if the debt-
to-GDP ratio increased in the US, investors in the rest of the world would
require a higher return on US securities, leading to a higher share of US
assets in their portfolios or a reduction of net borrowing from the US. Of
course, our approach should be viewed only as a crude approximation to
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58. Fluctuations in ZB cannot be large enough to push   B above 1.in response to macroeconomic imbalances, whose endogenization should
be eventually incorporated in a self-contained model. It remains unclear,
however, whether a framework that incorporates a large amount of com-
plications from which we abstract here would add much to our qualitative
conclusions. Quantitatively, one could take b∗
FDES as a free variable and es-
timate the  F1and  F2parameters on the basis of empirical evidence on the
link between net asset positions and debt levels. Alternatively, one could
rely on cross-fertilization with respect to alternative theoretical models
able to shed light on the structural determinants of these parameters, as
mentioned in the preceding.
Households accumulate physical capital which they rent to domestic
ﬁrms at the after-tax rate r (1 –  K). The law of motion of capital is
(A44) Kt 1( j)gt,t 1   (1    )Kt(j)    I,tKt( j)0      1,
where   is the country-speciﬁc depreciation rate of capital. To simulate re-
alistic investment ﬂows, capital accumulation is subject to adjustment
costs. Capital accumulation is denoted   I,tKt( j), where   I(.) is an increas-
ing, concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable function of the invest-
ment or capital ratio It( j)/Kt( j) with two properties entailing no adjust-
ment costs in steady state:   I(  g – 1)    g – 1 and    I(  g – 1)   1.
The speciﬁc functional form we adopt is quadratic and encompasses iner-
tia in investment:
  I,t( j)         (  g   1) 
2
       
2
,
where  I1,  I2   0, and g is the steady-state growth rate.
Each household j is the monopolistic supplier of a speciﬁc labor input
and sets the nominal wage for its labor variety j accounting for (A29). La-
bor incomes are taxed at the rate  L. There is sluggish wage adjustment due
to resource costs that are measured in terms of the total wage bill. The ad-
justment cost is denoted   WFL,t (for wage forward-looking) and its speciﬁ-
cation is the analog of (A33), recalling that the real wage is expressed in de-
trended terms:
(A45)   WFL,t(j)     t 1,tgt 1,t   1 
2
Ricardian households own all domestic ﬁrms, and there is no interna-
tional trade in claims on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The variable   includes all divi-
dends accruing to shareholders, plus all revenue from nominal and real
adjustment rebated in a lump-sum way to all Ricardian households, plus
revenue from ﬁnancial intermediation which is assumed to be provided by
domestic ﬁrms exclusively.
Finally, agents pay lump-sum (nondistortionary) net taxes TT t( j) de-
nominated in consumption units.
wt( j)/wt 1(j)
   Π0.25
t 4,tgt 1,t
 WFL  
2
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The representative Ricardian household chooses bond holdings, capital
and consumption paths, and sets wages to maximize its expected lifetime
utility (A38) subject to (A40) and (A44), taking into account (A29).
For expositional convenience, it is worthwhile to write explicitly the










 t, gt, 
1   u[C (j), w 
   (j)w 
    ] 
    ( j)  B ( j)   e B  ∗( j)  
   (1    K, )r K ( j) 
  (1    L, )w (j)1   w 
    {1    W, [w ( j), w  1(j)]}   C (j)   pE, I (j) 
    (j)  TT (j)     (j)[ K  1(j)g ,  1 (1    )K (j)    I,  K (j)] ,
where   and   are the multipliers associated with, respectively, the budget
constraint and capital accumulation.
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to Ct( j) and It( j) yield
(A47)  t( j)    .
In a symmetric setup, ∂ut( j)/∂Ct( j) is the same across Ricardian agents j.
Their stochastic discount rate and pricing kernel is therefore the variable
Dt, , which is deﬁned as
(A48) D t,     t, gt, 
1   .
Accounting for the preceding expressions, the ﬁrst-order conditions with
respect to Bt( j) and Bt ∗( j) are, respectively,
(A49) 1   (1   it)EtDt,t 1
(A50) 1   (1   it ∗)(1    B,t)Et(Dt,t 1 t,t 1)
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   1, g  1, 
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In a nonstochastic steady state (A49) implies (1   i)/  g / , where   is
the (gross steady-state quarterly) inﬂation rate, (1   i)/  is the real interest
rate, gis the (gross steady-state quarterly) rate of growth of the world econ-
omy, 1/  is the rate of time preference, and g /  is the natural rate of the
economy.59Expressions (A49) and (A50) yield the risk-adjusted uncovered
interest parity, recalling that the return on international bond holdings is
modiﬁed to account for the costs of intermediation   B. In a nonstochastic
steady state, the interest diﬀerential (1   i)/[(1   i∗)(1 –   B)] is equal to the
steady-state nominal depreciation rate of the currency vis-à-vis the US and
relative purchasing power parity holds.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Kt 1( j) is
(A52) Etgt,t 1   Et Dt,t 1 t,t 1gt,t 1 (1    K,t 1)rt 1  
  1      I,t 1(j)      I,t 1(j)    .
Expression (A52) links capital accumulation to the behavior of the after-
tax price of capital (1 –  K)r. In a nonstochastic steady state, 1   (1 –  K)r/
pE is equal to the sum of the natural real rate g 
  and the rate of capital de-
preciation  .60
Finally, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to w( j) determines wage
dynamics for the wages of the Ricardian households:
(A53)   t   ( t   1)[1    WFL,t(j)](1    L,t) 
  wt( j)(1    L,t) 
  EtDt,t 1 t,t 1gt,t 1
  wt(j)(1    L,t 1)
∂ WFL,t 1( j)
  
∂wt(j)




















pE,t 1  
   I,t 1(j)
pE,t  
   I,t( j)
 t,   
 ∗
t,t
ε   
et
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59. International diﬀerences in natural rates can arise from asymmetric rates of time pref-
erence. They are accounted for in the deﬁnition of   B in (A42).
60. The expectation operator on the left-hand side of (A52) is needed as shocks to the trend
gt,t 1are not part of the information set at time t. This is because variables are expressed as de-
viations from the current trend. An alternative speciﬁcation that expresses variables as devi-
ations from the lagged trend would make little diﬀerence.Note that in expression (A53) the wage rate of the Ricardian household
w( j) is not equal to the average wage rate in the economy w. In a nonsto-
chastic steady state, the real wage w( j) is equal to the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between consumption and leisure, –u /uc, augmented by the
markup  /(  – 1), which reﬂects monopoly power in the labor market.
Consumer Optimization (Liquidity-Constrained Households)
Liquidity-constrained households have no access to capital markets.
Their optimal choices are conﬁned to labor supply. Similar to Ricardian
households, they can optimally set their wages to exploit their market
power. The maximization problem of agent j ∈ [(1 – sLC)s, s] can be written
in terms of the following static Lagrangian:
(A54) max
Ct( j),wt(j)
u[Ct( j),  t( j)]    t( j)( Ct( j)   TT t(j) 
  (1    L,t)wt( j)1  twt
 t t{1    WLC,t[wt(j), wt 1(j)]})
It is assumed that redistributive policies rebate to these households the income
losses associated with wage adjustment so that their consumption level is
(A55) Ct(j)   (1    L,t)wt( j) t(j).
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to C( j) and w( j) determine partial
adjustment of wages:
(A56)   t  
(1    L,t){( t   1)[1    WLC,t( j)]   wt(j)}
Denoting wFLthe wage rate w( j) that solves (A53), and wLC the wage rate
w( j) that solves (A56), equation (A27) determines the wage rate for the
whole economy as
(A57) wt
1  t   sLCwLC,t
1  t   (1   sLC)wFL,t
1  t.
Government
Public spending falls on nontradable goods, both ﬁnal and intermediate.
In per capita terms, GC is government consumption, GI is government in-
vestment, and GN denotes public purchases of intermediate nontradables.
There are three sources of (net) tax revenue: taxes on capital income  K,
taxes on labor income  L, and lump-sum taxes TTnet of transfers to house-
holds. The government ﬁnances the excess of public expenditure over net
taxes by issuing debt denominated in nominal currency, denoted B in per
capita terms. All national debt is held exclusively by domestic (Ricardian)
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where
(A59) Gt   G C,t   pE,tGI,t   pN,tGN,t
and
(A60) GREV ,t     
s
0
TT t( j)dj    K,trt 
0
s(1 sLC)
Kt( j)dj    L,t 
s
0
wt( j) t( j)dj .
Deﬁne now the average tax rate for the economy   as
(A61)  t   .
Similarly, deﬁne the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio as
(A62)   Bt    /GDP t.
From (A58), in steady state we have:
(A63)          
The previous equations deﬁne the relations between debt-to-GDP, average
tax rate, and deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio that are sustainable in the long term. In
what follows we treat the long-run debt-to-GDP ratio as a policy parameter
set by the government, and let   and DEF/GDP be determined by (A63).
The government is assumed to control lump-sum taxes,   and  K directly,
while  L is endogenously determined. The ﬁscal rule for   is speciﬁed as
(A64)  t  
   TAX1     TAX2bTAR,t (1    TAX2)  
   TAX3         TAX4     ,
where bTAR is an autoregressive process for the targeted debt-to-GDP ratio
converging to B   GDP. The tax rate is a smoothed function of past and
expected future rates, adjusted upward when the current debt-to-GDP ra-
tio is above the average of its current target and its past observed level,
when the current deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio is above its sustainable steady-state
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Smooth Landing or Crash? Model-Based Scenarios 445The government controls the short-term rate it. Monetary policy is spec-
iﬁed in terms of annualized interest rate rules of the form
(A65) (1   it)4    i(1   it 1)4   (1    i)(1   it
neut)4
   1Et( t 1,t 3  Πt 1,t 3).
The current interest rate it is an average of the lagged rate it–1 and the cur-
rent neutral rate it
neut, deﬁned as61
(A66) 1   it
neut   .
This average is adjusted to account for the expected inﬂation gap three-
quarters in the future.62 In a steady state when all constant targets are
reached, it must be the case that
(A67) 1   i   1   ineut    .
Market Clearing
The model is closed by imposing the following resource constraints and
market clearing conditions, adopting explicit country indexes.



























The resource constraint for the nontradable good nH is
(A70) Nt








E,t(nH, eH)deH   GH
N,t(nH),
while the tradable hH can be used by domestic ﬁrms or imported by foreign
ﬁrms:
(A71) T t(hH)   
sH
0























t 4,t(gt 1,t) 
  
 t 1,t
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61. Recall that Πt– ,t–  4is the year-on-year gross CPI inﬂation target prevailing at time tfor
the four-quarter period between t –   and t –   4.
62. In the case of AS, we model an exchange rate targeting regime by introducing the com-
ponent  2
AS t
ASin (A65), where  ASis deﬁned in (A51), and we choose a very high value of  2
AS
to peg the nominal bilateral exchange rate against the US.The ﬁnal good A can be used for private (by both liquidity-constrained



























H( jH)djH   sHGH
I,t.
All proﬁts and intermediation revenue (ignoring import adjustment costs)
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Bt∗CO( j CO)dj CO   0
for the international bond market. Finally, aggregating the budget con-
straints across private and public agents after imposing the appropriate
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(A78) pH
T,tTt
H   pH
Q,t(QH






CO,H   ME,t
CO,H).
Measuring Output and Current Account
Expression (A78) can be written as
(A79) CURBALt
H   et
H,US Bt ∗H        TBALt
H.
The left-hand side of (A79) is country H’s current account, the ﬁrst term
on the right-hand side are net factor payments from the rest of the world to
country H, and TBAL is the trade balance. The latter can be thought of as
(A80) TBALt
H   EXt
H   IMt
H,
where total exports EX are
(A81) EXt
H   pH
T,tTt
H   pH
Q,t(QH
A,t   QH
E,t),






H,CO   ME,t
H,CO).
Finally, we deﬁne the model-based GDP (in consumption units) as
(A83) GDPt
H   At
H   pH
E,tEt
H   pH
N,tGH
N,t   EXt









H   TBALt
H  
  GDPt
H   (Ct
H   pH
E,tIt
H   Gt
H)   .
While theoretically sound, this measure of output would bear little simi-
larity with standard ﬁxed-weight, constant-dollar measures of real GDP
provided by national accounts. The problem is particularly severe for rela-
tively open economies facing large swings in real exchange rates and rela-
tive prices. In our simulations, we therefore adopt national accounts con-
cepts for GDP, TBAL, and their components, evaluating constant-dollar
expenditures at any time t by using ﬁxed steady-state prices instead of the
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Comment Lars E. O. Svensson
I enjoyed reading this ﬁne paper by Faruqee, Laxton, Muir, and Pesenti. I
believe it is worthwhile to see the paper in the context of the lively debate
in the recent literature on current-account developments, especially given
the large U.S. current-account deﬁcit.
The recent literature includes much-noted contributions of Gourinchas
and Rey (2005) and of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) on the role of the
currency composition of gross assets and liabilities, revaluation eﬀects, and
return diﬀerences on home and foreign debt and assets.
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ(2004, 2005) have recently presented a more formal
model of the relation between the current account and the real exchange
rate for the U.S. economy, available in two-country and three-country ver-
sions. They emphasize the role of home bias in consumption and develop
a static relation between the current account and the real exchange rate.
The following ratios are deﬁned:
ca   , f   ,     , x   , 
x∗   ,  T   ,  N   ,  ∗
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Lars E. O. Svensson is a professor of economics at Princeton University, and a research as-
sociate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
I thank Kathleen Hurley for secretarial and editorial assistance.Here, CA denotes the U.S. current account measured in dollars; P H and Y H
are the dollar price and output of U.S.-produced tradable goods; F   0 is
U.S. net foreign assets (NFA) measured in dollars; P F is the dollar price of
foreign-produced tradable goods, so   is the terms of trade; P N is the dollar
price of U.S.-produced nontradable goods; P T is the tradable-goods U.S.
consumption price index; P∗
N and P∗
T are the foreign-currency price of for-
eign-produced nontradable goods and the tradable-goods foreign con-
sumption price index, respectively; Y N is the output of U.S.-produced non-
tradable goods; and Y∗
N and  Y F are the outputs of foreign-produced
nontradable and tradable goods, respectively. They derive three indepen-
dent equations:
1   (1   rf   ca)   
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    rf   ca 




  x  [  (1    ) 1  ] 1/(1  )(1   rf   ca)
 ∗
N     (x∗)  [  (1    )  (1  )] 1/(1  ) 1   r  
 
 
T  f    
 
 
T  ca 
Here,   is the consumption share of own-produced tradable goods in trad-
able goods consumption, so home bias in consumption is indicated by   
1/2;   is the elasticity of substitution in consumption between home- and
foreign-produced tradable goods; r is the dollar rate of return on U.S. net
foreign assets;   is the consumption share of tradable goods in total con-
sumption; and   is the elasticity of substitution in consumption between
tradable and nontradable goods. Given this, they solve for  , x, x∗for given
ca   0 (the U.S. current account surplus as a fraction of U.S. tradable-
goods output), f,  T,  N, and  ∗
N. Denote this solution as a function of ca
by  (ca), x(ca), and x∗(ca). They then derive the real exchange rate, e, as a
function of ca as
e(ca)    
1 (1  )  
1 (1  )
.
Finally, they compute e(0) – e(ca), the change in the real exchange rate
from reducing the U.S. current-account deﬁcit to zero (that is, reducing ca
from negative to zero).
The main result is that such a reduction of the U.S. current account
deﬁcit is associated with a relatively large real depreciation of the dollar.
However, a problem with Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s analysis is that it is com-
pletely static. There is no dynamics, and there is no explicit saving and in-
vestment. Furthermore, the dollar-value of U.S. net foreign assets is mostly
taken as given, although there are some cases where revaluation eﬀects are
discussed.
  (1    )x∗(ca)1  
   
  (1    )x(ca)1  
  (ca)1     (1    )
   
(1    ) (ca)1     
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452 Hamid Faruqee, Douglas Laxton, Dirk Muir, and Paolo A. PesentiBlanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) have recently presented a more dy-
namic model than the Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ one. They emphasize the im-
portance of imperfect substitutability of U.S.- and foreign-based assets
and of home bias in asset holdings. They derive a portfolio-balance rela-
tion,
X    (Re
  )(X   F)   [1    ∗(Re
 )](eX∗   F).
Here, X and X∗ are given stocks of U.S.- and foreign-based assets (mea-
sured in home and foreign goods, respectively);  (Re) denotes the share of
U.S. wealth held as U.S.-based assets and is increasing in the expected
(real) rate-of-return diﬀerence between U.S.- and foreign-based assets,
Re   1   r   r∗   ,
where r and r∗ now denote U.S. and foreign real interest rates; F now de-
notes U.S. net foreign assets measured in U.S. goods;  ∗(Re) is the share of
foreign wealth held as foreign based assets and is decreasing in the ex-
pected rate-of-return diﬀerence. The current account dynamics is given by
F
.
  rF   [1    (Re)] r∗    r (X   F)   TB(ε
 ),
where TB(e) denotes the U.S. trade-balance surplus and is increasing in the
real exchange rates (it increases with a real dollar depreciation). The steady
state is characterized by e˘   F
.
  0 and determines a steady-state relation
between net foreign assets and the real exchange rate,
0   rF   [1    (1   r   r∗)](r   r∗)(X   F )   TB(e).
A jump in the real exchange rate at date t, e(t) – e(t–), results in a revalua-
tion of net foreign assets according to
F(t)   F(t )   [1    (t )][X   F(t )]    1 .
Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) examine the dynamic adjustment of
the U.S. net foreign assets and the real exchange rate from current levels to-
wards a steady state for a number of diﬀerent shocks. The main result is
that the steady state is characterized by a larger U.S. net foreign debt and a
weaker real dollar than the current situation. However, a problem with the
analysis is that it is only partial equilibrium: the home and foreign real in-
terest rates, r and r∗, are simply given, and there is no explicit saving and
investment. The trade-balance equation is too simple, especially in com-
parison with the trade-balance equation resulting from the Obstfeld-
Rogoﬀ model.
The paper by Faruqee, Laxton, Muir, and Pesenti allows a potential syn-










Smooth Landing or Crash? Model-Based Scenarios 453ature. They have an impressive multicountry dynamic general equilibrium
model, a very sophisticated relation between the current account and the
real exchange rate, endogenous saving and investment, and endogenous
home and foreign interest rates. They can provide a sophisticated analysis
of the dynamics of the current account.
But the authors do not seem to utilize their model’s potential fully. Re-
garding revaluation eﬀects, their model is too simple: net foreign assets are
only denominated in U.S. currency (or a currency basket). It would be
worthwhile to incorporate gross assets and liabilities and to allow diﬀerent
currency compositions of these for diﬀerent countries.
What about the portfolio choice between home- and foreign-based as-
sets? What about the degree of substitutability and home bias? Again, their
impressive model is still too simple: Home- and foreign-based assets are
perfect substitutes. Furthermore, there is a given target NFA-GDP ratio,
independent of relative returns. (There are some intermediation fees in-
curred when actual NFA or GDP deviates from the target NFA-GDP ra-
tio.) The portfolio-choice modeling could be improved considerably.
The Faruqee, Laxton, Muir, and Pesenti paper would beneﬁt from dis-
cussing the previous literature in more detail and comparing its ﬁndings. In
addition to the papers mentioned, there is also the dramatic crisis scenario
presented by Roubini and Setser (2004) that the authors may want to com-
ment on and compare with. This is so, in particular, as the simulations con-
ducted in the Faruqee, Laxton, Muir, and Pesenti paper result in relatively
benign outcomes. Are these really realistic?
There is a general problem with how monetary policy is modeled in the
paper. The paper relies on so-called inﬂation forecast–based instrument
rules (IFB rules), where the instrument rate fulﬁlls a speciﬁed (equilib-
rium) relation with inﬂation projections. There are many problems with
this approach, which I have emphasized in several diﬀerent papers (for in-
stance, Svensson [2001] and Svensson and Woodford [2003]). Probably an-
ticipating my reaction, the authors state in footnote 18: “It is important to
note that IFB rules are ad hoc. Svensson (1999) and Svensson and Wood-
ford (2005) have proposed Inﬂation-Forecast-Targeting (IFT) rules based
on optimizing loss functions and it is only a question of time before IFT
rules are used extensively on linearized versions of models whose types and
size are similar to ours.” (Emphasis added.) If it is only a question of time,
why not now? Why continue to use ad hoc instrument rules but not ad hoc
consumption and investment rules? An ad hoc IFB rule is arguably even
more ad hoc than an explicit (outcome-based) instrument rule (Svensson
2001; Levin, Wieland, and Williams 2003). There are better alternatives,
namely optimizing monetary policy, ﬁrst-order conditions or targeting
rules, and so forth.
In summary, this is a very impressive and interesting model, with con-
siderable ﬂexibility for examining a number of diﬀerent issues. The model
454 Hamid Faruqee, Douglas Laxton, Dirk Muir, and Paolo A. Pesentihas great potential, and this potential is far from exhausted in the current
version. In particular, the points I make in the preceding do not seem diﬃ-
cult to incorporate, should the authors wish to do so.
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